

# **An Assessment of Widow Allowance Programme in Bangladesh – the Supply Side Perspectives**

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**2012**



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*Dedicated to my loving family  
who always inspired me and  
provided me with all sorts of support*

## ABSTRACT

Social Safety Nets (SSNs) are non-contributory programmes that target the poor and vulnerable section of population and are designed to reduce poverty and inequality, enable better human capital investments, improve social risk management, and offer social protection to people living below poverty line. In Bangladesh both cash and in kind transfer Safety Net Programmes are in operation. Bangladesh government with the commitment to alleviate poverty within the shortest possible time took the initiative of including the most vulnerable section and poor people under different Safety Net Programmes. Among the different Safety Net Programmes, the Allowance Programme for Widowed, Divorced and Husband Deserted Distressed Women's Allowance Programme is one of the most important programmes dealing with one of the most vulnerable, marginalized section of the population. However, currently the effectiveness of the programme is under question from different corners. Considering the goals and objectives of the government from the perspectives of the vulnerable section of the population and the expenditure on the Social Safety Net programmes, a systematic assessment of the effectiveness of the Programme is long over-due and the present study is an attempt to that direction to assess the Widow Allowance Programme from the supply side perspectives.

The thesis makes an attempt to measure the effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme in terms of the process of selection of beneficiaries. The study examines the extent to which the government implementation guideline of the Widow Allowance Programme was followed by the implementing officials. The study also examines the role and effects of the factors such as patronage, corruption and nature of organizational practices on the effectiveness of the programme. The study focuses on the issues such as (1) The extent to which implementing officials act consistently with the objectives and procedures outlined in the policy guideline; (2) To assess the roles played by different factors & actors and their interaction and interplay at different stages of implementation process of the Widow Allowance Programme.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative method has been used in this study. Both primary and secondary sources of data have been gathered. Specifically the study is based on interviews, surveys and case study methods.

The study finds out that in case of selection the government provided guideline was not always followed. Selection of beneficiaries was dependent on local political considerations. Quite often than not the most deserving women were left out of this Safety Net Programme. Local leaders in most cases were found to have used this programme to their political advantages and to also earn extra-legal income for them. This study has also found out that inadequate and irregular monitoring and supervision of the implementation process by the higher authorities has made the programme relatively less effective.

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>BBS</b>	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
<b>SSNP</b>	Social Safety Net Programme
<b>UP</b>	Union Parishad
<b>DD</b>	Deputy Director
<b>UNO</b>	Upazila Nirbahi Officer
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>PIF</b>	Policy Implementation Framework
<b>CCT</b>	Conditional Cash Transfer
<b>UCT</b>	Unconditional Cash Transfer
<b>VGD</b>	Vulnerable Group Development
<b>CSG</b>	Child Support Grant
<b>FSSAP</b>	Female Secondary School Assistance Programme
<b>RMP</b>	Rural Maintenance Programme
<b>IGA</b>	Income Generating Activities
<b>GoB</b>	Government of Bangladesh
<b>FFW</b>	Food for work
<b>VGF</b>	Vulnerable Group Feeding
<b>TR</b>	Test Relief
<b>GR</b>	Gratuitous Relief

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

First of all, I would like to express my heartiest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Mobasser Monem, for his invaluable suggestions and outstanding guidance throughout my thesis writing. Without his support my thesis would not be able to see the light. His discussions and suggestions were very inspiring and finally shaped my ideas to carry out my work. Albeit his heavy and hectic academic schedule, during this study he was always available to provide me directions and suggestions.

I would like to extend to convey cordial thanks to Professor Dr. Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman, for introducing me with the craft of research. He always showered his knowledge and advice to track the right way. His scholarly suggestions helped me to fix my goal.

I would like to convey my sincere thanks to Professor Dr. Ishtiaq Jamil, Dr. Sk. Tawfique M. Haque, Dr. Rizwan Khaer and Md. Mahfuzul Haque to enrich me with their profound advices, which helped me to refine and accomplish the daunting task.

I would like to thank the government officials and public representatives of the two study areas of my research one in Mithapukur and the other in Dumuria who were very cooperative in giving all sorts of information regarding my thesis work during my field visits. Without their active participation I might not be able to get the true picture of the different dimensions of the programme.

I would also like to thank my fellow researchers from the depth of my heart who time to time came up with useful tips and suggestions. Their feedbacks helped me a lot to organize this paper in a better way. I am also thankful to the entire office staff and research associates of the Master in Public Policy and Governance (MPPG) program for their all out support and cooperation.

Last but not the least I would like to express my thanks to my loving family who always inspired me and provided me with all sorts of support to make me my work done.

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North South University, Dhaka, 2012.

# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background:

With about 40 percent of its population living below the poverty line and an increasing number of population being added below the lower poverty line, Safety Net Programme in Bangladesh is more than a necessary element in fighting poverty (Iqbal, 2008). Bangladesh government with the commitment to alleviate poverty within the shortest possible time took the initiative of including the most vulnerable section and poor people under different Safety Net Programmes to reduce their sufferings. PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) documents identify social protection<sup>1</sup> strategies as one of the pillars of Poverty reduction, which includes: (I) ensuring macroeconomic stability to ensure pro-poor growth; (ii) improving governance for sustaining growth and poverty reduction; (iii) investing in human development to enhance human capabilities; and (iv) implementing social protection programmes to reduce vulnerabilities and improve income-generating opportunities.

Since independence in 1971, when 70% of the population lived below the poverty line, the two major vehicles of Social Safety Nets were food rations and relief work following disasters and other calamities. With the passage of time, when notable progress towards reducing widespread poverty was made, the country had to find better means of targeting. Such realization led to the emergence of new and sophisticated programmes and abandonment of programmes like food rations (Morshed,2009).To encounter new dimensions of vulnerabilities and to address newly affected people resulting from growing pace of globalization, different economic shocks and natural calamities, government is including diversified types of Safety Net Programmes.

There are more than 30 Social Safety Net Programmes are now in operation in Bangladesh. As new programmes are added and old programmes dropped/suspended at regular intervals, so the exact number fluctuates. Almost all ministries or agencies are pursuing some work directly or indirectly which are contributing to poverty alleviation or adding to the wellbeing and empowerment of the poor. Among these different Safety Net Programmes, the Allowance

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of 'social safety net' came from the broader term 'social protection'(Zohir, S. et al.,2010)

Programme for Widowed, Divorced and Husband Deserted Distressed Women is one of the most important programmes dealing with one of the most vulnerable, marginalized section of the population. Considering the realities and sufferings of widowed and distressed women with the intention to reduce their vulnerability, the government of Bangladesh took initiative for their social protection and security, and initiated Widow and Husband Deserted Destitute Women's Allowance Programme in 1998 under the Ministry of Social Welfare.

In Bangladesh, the allocation for Social Safety Net Programmes is gradually increasing over the years. Starting in 1975 it has been growing fast in Bangladesh (allocation, coverage etc). In 1996, Social Safety Net contributed 0.8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 5.7 percent of the total public expenditure (World Bank, 2008). With gradual expansion now in 2010-11, Social Safety Net is contributing 2.64 percent of total GDP. (Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Social Welfare, 2012).

Starting from 1998, like other Safety Net Programmes the allocation for Widow Allowance Programme is also in rise over the years. In 1999-2001 budget allocation for this programme was 12.5 crore and the number of beneficiaries was 1, 04,167. With gradual expansion in 2010-11 the amount reaches to 331.00 crore and number of beneficiaries reaches up to 9, 20000. (Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Social Welfare, 2012).

With the intention and broader objective to provide social security to the marginalized section of people, government is gradually expanding the Social Safety Net programmes but to make the programme more effective needed assessment of these programmes yet to be done. It has increasingly been realized that a proper assessment should be done; overall capacity needs to be further strengthened and made compatible with the growth pace. The effectiveness of a programme depends on how well the programme is being implemented and on the overall achievement of the declared objectives of the programme. The present study intends to find out effectiveness of the implementation process of the programme with a particular focus on selection of beneficiaries at the field level.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem:**

Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world having a vital portion of its population living below poverty line. People from different marginalized group undergo immeasurable miseries and sufferings throughout their lifetime and whenever there is any shock or disaster their standard of living deteriorate further in countless manner. While all poor people are victims of poverty, but among them widowed, divorced and abandoned poor women generally undergo unparalleled amount of sufferings and vulnerabilities.

In a country like Bangladesh most of the rural women are left behind in all the sectors as they are not aware of their rights in the family, society or state. Illiteracy is the main cause behind this. So it is very easy to exploit the diffident women by all possible means. Due to the lack of education and competence most of the poor women cannot participate in the mainstream job market. In addition they cannot engage themselves in self-employment because of constraints of fund. Without having education and economic emancipation, the distressed women do not have proper voice in the family or society, their share in the leadership in any level is minimal, so as to their freedom of choice. Women's social vulnerability is all-pervasive and endemic. Discrimination against women at the social level are reflected in their confinement within the homestead, lack of mobility in the public space, women's early marriage etc. Women have weak protection socially and legally in the event of break-up of marriages. They face high level of vulnerability such as losing honor, high degree of divorce and abandonment etc. Thus, due to lack of power in society in order to influence their situation women cannot empower themselves. The widowed and husband deserted distressed women are the most severe victims of this complicated condition.

Widowed, divorced and abandoned women constitute about 11.29 percent of total married women in the country (BBS: 2003). In the eyes of society, a widow is treated as burden and is therefore neglected; a widow is seen to have lost their honor in the family and society, particularly in the poor community. The widowed women do not have freedom of choice, which is one of the basic requirements of empowerment. Particularly in the rural areas most of the rural women of Bangladesh are basically housewives and their husbands are the only earning members of their families. Becoming widowed means losing the only breadwinner, speaking

from a rigid livelihood point of view .If she lives with the extended family in most of the cases after her husband's death she can't live in her husband's family or she can't go back to her parents because of poor economic condition of the other members to bear their burden. Given the circumstances the life becomes very painful to her, as she does not have any economic support and honor. Becoming widowed has not only the economic consequences but it has also social and psychological impacts. Among the destitute women those who are divorced or old and have minor children are exposed to the most uncertainties. In the rural areas of Bangladesh, old people, especially old women, are treated as a burden on the family and some are even forced to move out to the streets for begging. Generally, poverty is thought to be the main reason behind this. While their children cannot manage their own livelihood, most of the cases, they fail to maintain their parents.

The poor people, particularly the distressed women have the least opportunity to get support from the job/labor market and cannot enjoy the family support sufficiently because of incapability of their family members. In that case the state intervention is the last resort for them. Along this line, in order to address the poverty of the widowed and distressed women government of Bangladesh undertook the scheme called "Allowance Scheme for Widowed and Husband-deserted Distressed Women" which is mostly known as "Widow Allowance Programme" in 1998. The objectives of the Scheme are to empower distressed widowed, divorced and husband-deserted women through financial support and to improve their status both within the family and in the society.

Government has given more importance on Social Safety Net as a poverty reduction measure. Considering the requirements of these programmes, the state has been expanding their intervention in terms of coverage and total amount of allocation. But there are lots of debates as to the effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme and as well as other Safety Net Programmes as a whole. Many reports, journal articles, paper news focusing lots of news relating to improper enlistment, corruption, harassment of beneficiaries in terms of getting proper and timely services etc. It is interesting to note that as far as Widow Allowance programme is concerned, budget allocation for this programme is on the rise every year without proper assessment of the effectiveness of this programme.

### **1.3 Scope of Research:**

For gathering primary data we have covered two Unions representing two Upazilas. The criteria we followed for selecting these Unions were as follows:

- a) A poverty stricken Upazila
- b) An Upazila having relatively better economic profile.

Considering the above criteria we have chosen one impoverish Union that is the Latifpur Union under Mithapukur Upazila and other one is the Kharnia Union under Dumuria Upazila which had a relatively better economic profile. It is assumed that a comparative study in two different areas with different socio-economic profiles might add value and quality to this research and it might as well help us understand was there any variation with regard to the implementation modalities and effectiveness in terms of selection of beneficiaries in two sampled Unions having different socio-economic and geographic characteristics.

### **1.4 Significance of the Research:**

Considering the goals and objectives of the government from the perspective of the vulnerable section of the people and the expenditure on the Social Safety Net Programmes, assessment on the effectiveness of the Safety Net Programme is needed. There are in general some studies related to the Social Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh. There is still very little specific research on the assessment of the implementation effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme with regards to the selection of beneficiaries. This study makes an attempt to assess as to how effectively the implementation process of this programme was carried out.

### **1.5 Research Question:**

How effective is the implementation process of Widow Allowance Programme of the government of Bangladesh?



## **1.6 Objective of the Research**

- To examine the roles played by different factors & actors and their interactions and interplay at the different stages of implementation of the Widow Allowance Programme.
- To assess the extent to which the implementation policy guideline was followed in case of selection of beneficiaries in particular and also in other stages of implementation of the Widow Allowance Programme.

## **1.7 Limitations**

Because of the time and financial constraints we had to focus on the implementation of this benefit programme in two Union Parishads only while this Allowance Programme is a nationwide Programme covering all Unions of the country. However, we have paid special attention in drawing the sample Unions and therefore we would claim that the findings of the research would be representative.

## **1.8 Structure of the Thesis:**

Chapter one of the thesis provides an introductory discussion, chapter two offers the reviews of literature while chapter three contains Research Methodology, chapter four provides the conceptual framework, chapter five offers the overview of the Social Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh ,Chapter six provides an overview of the Widow Allowance Programme in Bangladesh. Findings and analysis of the research is presented in chapter seven whereas chapter eight deals with the Summary of findings, Conclusion and Recommendation.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter deals with existing literatures having bearing upon the implementation dynamics of the Social Safety Net Programme in the context of Bangladesh and other parts of the world. This chapter reviews the existing literatures on implementation of the Social Safety Net Programme to extract useful and relevant information, ideas and concepts.

### **2.2 Literatures Related to Social Safety Net Programme:**

There are very few literatures in the specific area relating to the assessment of the “Widow Allowance programme”. But lots of literatures related to the overview of the Social Safety Net programmes as well as their effectiveness have been found. So, first of all we shall have some idea from literature review on Social Safety Net, their effectiveness from broader perspective and then have some focus on the study related to the “Widow Allowance Programme”.

The basic idea about the Safety Net Programmes of Bangladesh and their strength in poverty and risk reduction was found in a study named, “Strengthening Social Safety Nets in Bangladesh”. This study highlighted that there is hardly any programmes for the people who fall in various troubles at various stages of the life. This study suggested that Safety Nets can play an important role in alleviating poverty and promoting long-term growth by providing households with the protection. Here a more recently identified role for safety nets was identified as to help households to manage risk.

In the paper national Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction “Unlocking the Potential “it has been mentioned that Bangladesh has a robust portfolio of Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNP) which addresses various forms of risk and vulnerability and attempt to reduce poverty through direct transfer of resources to the poor. The portfolio has been responsive to changing risk assessments and has witnessed a fair degree of programme innovation. Thus, a food rationing system gave way food-for-work programme and subsequently to vulnerable group development and food-for-education programmes as well as incentive programmes such as

school stipend which combine safety net objectives with human development objectives. The arguments in favour of SSN are based on the government's policy to (a) reduce income uncertainty and variability; (b) maintain a minimum standard of living; and (c) redistribute income from the rich to the poor. The basic operational characteristics of an SSN is that it transfers resources in cash or kind directly to a specified group of people (the poor, women, disadvantaged groups, old people) through a delivery mechanism with or without certain condition being binding upon the recipients. In this paper the focus has been in the existence of different Safety Net Programmes and their contribution in reducing poverty.

“With multi-agency and multi-ministry involvement in managing Safety Net Programs in Bangladesh (Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, Ministry of Social Welfare, Ministry of Chittagong Hill tracts Special Affairs, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education etc) there is also multiplicity of committees to manage various SSN programs. These might lead to lack of coordination and overlapping at the one hand and inability to reaching the most deprived on the other” (M. Maniruzzaman, 2009).

In the same article it has been mentioned that Conning, Jonathon and Kevane, Michael (2000) interpreted several case studies and theory on community involvement in Social Safety Nets. They cautioned that benefits from utilizing local information and social capital may be eroded by costly rent seeking, elite capture and hinted that local preferences may not always be pro-poor and are vulnerable to declines in political support particularly in the case of locally administering centrally designed programmes.

In the PRSP document along with describing important Safety Net Programmes, took note of some of the weaknesses of the SSN programmes in Bangladesh. The noted weaknesses include (a) limited coverage (b) inadequacy of the grants per beneficiary and (c) leakages. It also took note of the lack of an integrated national policy and inadequate understanding of the gender dimensions of poverty. The PRSP then discussed the need for developing effective Social Safety Net programmes including the issue of governance. (PRSP document, 2005).

In the PRSP document various important suggestions were made for better targeting and improving efficiency, effectiveness and coordination of targeted poverty reduction programmes. In implementing such programmes, emphasis was laid on minimizing leakages, avoiding duplication and ensuring more coordinated endeavors. The need for expanding Social Safety Net Programmes and a more comprehensive social security system was highly emphasized. (M. Maniruzzaman, 2009).

Conning, Jonathon and Kevane, Michael (2000) noted that the growing awareness of the importance on Social Safety Nets in developing countries has not been translated into effective action because of the failure of traditional social welfare ministries to effectively reach and engage the poor. This has led to experimentation with new bottom-up service delivery options and poverty alleviation mechanisms that more actively involve the poor and their communities in programme design, implementation and monitoring.

Although SSN coverage has increased over the years, some of the very poor have not been reached and while some others, although in limited number, have received assistance from more than one source. The World Bank in its Project Information Document of Bangladesh National Social Protection Project noted existence of “considerable overlapping and duplication in program delivery” and involvement of “several ministries” with “overlapping objectives” and targeting “similar beneficiaries, with limited coordination”. Targeting efficiency was reported “moderate” as per assessment of the World Bank indicating the need for rethinking on targeting criteria and institutional delivery mechanisms (M. Maniruzzaman, 2009).

David P. Coady, in a study on “Designing and Evaluating Social Safety Nets: theory, evidence, and policy conclusions” mentioned that as widely practiced, existing Social Safety Nets are perceived to have a number of shortcomings that substantially reduce their effectiveness. First, they often fail to reach the intended target group, the poorest households. Second, they are made up of a myriad of small, uncoordinated, and duplicative transfer programmes. Third, a combination of operational inefficiencies and corruption results in an unnecessarily high cost of transferring resources to households. Fourth, even when the transfers do reach intended beneficiaries, they fail to generate a sustained decrease in poverty independent of the transfers.

Fifth, the transfers are often too small, and programme coverage too low, to have any noticeable effect on overall poverty.

Margaret Grosh, Carlo Del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi in a book “For Protection and Promotion the Design and Implementation of Effective Safety Nets” mentioned that-  
“The quality of implementation is vital. Good intentions are not sufficient; real Working systems need to be developed. A badly implemented programme is not worth doing. While numerous good examples exist to show that worthwhile programmes are possible in many settings, there are still more programmes that do not deliver all they could, and some do not deliver enough to be worth the money spent”.

It has also been mentioned that good Safety Net Programmes require investments in their administrative systems. Excessively high overheads are obviously undesirable—but so too are insufficient systems. Developing systems that allow programmes to become their most effective and deliver the most value for the money will require some investment. An important part of that investment is development over time by self-critical and Proactive managers.

Concentrating resources on the poor or vulnerable can increase the benefits that they can achieve within a given budget or can achieve a given impact at the lowest cost. The theoretical gain from targeting can appear to be large. For example, if all the benefits provided by a transfer programme were targeted to the poorest quintile of the population rather than uniformly distributed across the whole population, the budget savings or the difference in impact for a fixed budget would be five to one. In practice, the full theoretical gain is not realized, because targeting is never completely accurate, and because costs are associated with targeting. These costs include administrative costs borne by the programme, transaction and social costs borne by programme applicants, incentive costs that may affect the overall benefit to society, and political costs that may affect support for the programme. The size of targeting errors and costs will differ according to the setting and the types of targeting methods used and must be assessed carefully in any policy proposal (Grosh. M. et al, 2008).

In the same article it is mentioned that the problem is also with targeting and leakages. It focused that despite the successes of SSNP in Bangladesh, there have been causes of concern on several counts. There have been various administrative problems obstructing the smooth running of the programmes. Targeting has been off the mark in some of the programmes. In some cases, leakages have been more of a problem than targeting. Also in-kind transfers such as food may have depressed prices somewhat, and this could be a disincentive to small producers.

Consideration could be given to (i) establishing a clearing and designing house for keeping track and coordinating optimal utilization of scarce resources by avoiding duplication and dovetailing programmes so that the needs of the special groups may be catered to; (ii) minimizing the number and improving the accountability of intermediaries who are involved in administering Safety Net Programmes; (iii) establishing a standing arrangement for monitoring and overseeing the development and implementation of policies and programmes for Safety Net Programmes; (iv) coordinating the views and activities of the government and non-government organizations in SSN areas; (v) outsourcing responsibility for implementing Safety Net Programmes at the local level; (vi) introducing periodic evaluation of programmes to throw light on what is working and what is not; and (vii) allowing for reform and consolidation of programmes where needed. (“Unlocking the Potential” ,National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction)

Harold Alderman and John Hoddinott, in a study “Growth-promoting Social Safety Nets” mentioned that Social safety Nets are by no means sufficient to ensure pro-poor growth. Good governance, functional infrastructure, schools and health clinics, and so on are all important components of development strategies. Further, poorly designed or implemented Social Protection Programmes or those with only token funding, are unlikely to meet the intrinsic or instrumental objectives. Much depends on correct design. All effective Social Safety Nets have five key characteristics: (1) a clear objective; (2) a feasible means of identifying intended beneficiaries; (3) a means of transferring resources on a reliable basis; (4) ongoing monitoring of operations and rigorous evaluation of effectiveness; and (5) transparency in operation to encourage learning, minimize corruption, and ensure that beneficiaries and the wider population understand how the programme functions.

The study also pointed that, Safety Net interventions can contribute to economic growth through their impact on asset creation, asset protection, resource allocation, structural policy change, and redistribution. Social Safety Net interventions, when well designed and implemented, can complement pro-poor investments and thus contribute to longer term poverty reduction in addition to their short-term direct impacts.

Timothy Besley, Robin Burgess, and Imran Rasul in “Benchmarking Government Provision of Social Safety Nets” pointed that one of the main factors determining the effectiveness of Safety Nets is their ability to correctly target the poor. Targeting can be based either on self-reports from individuals (where incentives must be provided for individuals to truthfully report their well-being) or on measured household characteristics or regional characteristics. The other crucial issue regarding the ability of these programmes to effectively reach and be able to help the poor, is the manner in which they are implemented. For effective implementation we require a supportive institutional framework, i.e., one that is not subject to corruption or rent-seeking, or that is not plagued by bureaucracy, and where the rule of law is respected.

Barakat-E-Khuda in ‘The Bangladesh Development Studies’ (volume xxxiv, 2011), in a report, “Social Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh: a review” gave following recommendations that Social Safety Net Programmes need for 1) high-level political commitment.2) effective Programme management and delivery 3) better targeting of beneficiaries 4) minimizing leakages 5) sound financial management and payment system 6) strengthening, monitoring and supervision at different levels.

A study has been done on, “The Management of Social Safety Net Programmes and Role of Local Government (Union Parishad)” by “Democracy Watch”. They conducted the study on twenty eight Union Parishads. The findings of the study showed that almost all the Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh are suffering from improper targeting, illicit political influence, corruption, lack of coordination among implementation agencies, lack of monitoring and evaluation etc. Newly launched programmes are also not free from these problems. To overcome the problems all the aspects of programme implementation need to be addressed.

K.M. Kabirul Islam, Department of Social Sciences, Bodø University College, Bodø, Norway in a thesis paper, Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh: A Qualitative Analysis of the “Allowance Scheme for Widowed and Husband-deserted Distressed Women” had the following findings that the Scheme has important impact on the lives of the rural distressed women, who are either widowed or divorced or deserted by their husbands, to come out of severe insecurity of food, to have a better medical care and to manage comparatively good clothes. But deficiencies as a means of poverty reduction, failed to improve housing status and to create income generating activities.

In an evaluation report from Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC, (Research Monograph Series No.36) on “Small Scale Old Age and Widow Allowance for the Poor in Rural Bangladesh” mentioned that selection processes appears to be dominated by UP members and chairmen. Most of the respondent population actively lobbied to be selected as beneficiaries, suggesting a far greater willingness to engage politically among an elderly and marginal population than would necessarily have been expected. Beneficiaries were more likely than non beneficiaries to believe that the selection process was fair, and poor non beneficiaries were most likely of all groups to believe process was unfair and to have grievances with the process. There was some evidence of corruption in the process of beneficiary selection and in the distribution of benefits.

Asian human rights commission in a report, “Corruption Promotes Food and Health Insecurity for Elderly Widows in Northern Bangladesh” mentioned that, Elderly widows suffering from food and health insecurity. There has been no assistance from the government despite them being entitled to be beneficiaries of the Social Security Programmes. The corrupt public representatives and servants in charge of implementation of the programmes have deprived the elderly widows of their rights. It is discovered that some of the beneficiaries receiving food or cash subsidies had to pay bribes directly or indirectly to the public representatives of the Union Council. All the victims are landless and currently forced to beg to get food.



## **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction:**

In simplest terms, research methodology generally means the way of achieving the research objectives. To be more precise, it primarily focuses on the method(s) of data collection along with the justification of using the method(s). It also includes basic parameters to be chosen related to the selected method(s). In addition to that, the instruments for gathering data also fall within the definition of methodology of a research (Aminuzzaman, 1991). This chapter presents the methodology applied for collecting and processing data. It will elaborate research methods and techniques used for data collection and analysis.

### **3.2 Research Method:**

The study combines both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. The study has generally relied on interviews, surveys and case study methods. The researcher also conducted FGDs with relevant stakeholders. The study included interviewing some of the government officials, local representatives and key informants to have in depth idea about the implementation process of the area under study. The questions were both open and close ended. Closed ended questions were used to save time and open ended questions were used to have in-depth knowledge and insight of the respondents. Interview method is very helpful in this sense because “Interview is a systematic method by which a person enters deeply into the life of even a stranger and can bring out needed information and data for research proposal” (Aminuzzaman, 1991.p.82). Questionnaire survey method was used to gather primary data directly from the beneficiaries and those officials who were directly related with implementation process and this helped to get information which was very much helpful in the study. Case study method was used in this study to explore some important issues. This method is very important because “the case study helps to examine the complex situations and combination of factors involved in that situation so as to identify the causal factors operating” (Gopal, 1964). “It enables us to explore, unravel and understand problems, issues and relationships (Aminuzzaman, 1991: 43).” The use of case study method provides an opportunity for relating facts and concepts, reality and hypothesis (Wievioka, 1992). Another reason for choosing it is that “it is a holistic approach” in

which cases are studied as wholes (Regin, 1987). The study also used content analysis. This included collecting related information and data from all relevant government documents, important office documents, circulars, books, published and unpublished research works available, online articles etc. Focus Group Discussion (FGD) method was used to have in-depth understanding of the selection process. Lots of interesting and important findings came out in the discussion. The facts that came out helped to validate information of other methods.

### 3.3 Sources of Data

The data for this study was collected both from primary and secondary sources. Secondary data has been drawn from the existing literatures like official documents, books, newspaper reports, previous research works, seminar papers, reports etc. Primary data have been collected through questionnaire survey and interview.

### 3.4 Sample Design

Sample sizes for questionnaire survey for two Unions are like this-

Respondent types	No. of respondents (two unions)	Respondents
Government officers	8	Social welfare officials and workers
Beneficiaries	30	
Total	38	

Among the respondents the beneficiaries were selected on a random basis. The government officers were selected on the basis of their involvement with the process.

Besides the questionnaire survey these methods were applied -

<b>Methods</b>	<b>Number of respondents</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
Interview	20(two unions)	UNO, DD, Union Parishad Chairman/members, Officer of Women Affairs, Key informants, Higher officials
	14(two unions)	Non-beneficiaries
Case study	2(two unions)	
FGD	4(two unions)	

Interviews were conducted with officers like UNO, officers of the Directorate of Social Services, officer of Woman Affairs, officers at the ministry level. They were selected on the basis of their involvement with the process. The key informants were the local people (like the teacher, imam) who had broad acquaintance with the system. Some of the non-beneficiaries were also interviewed. Case studies were done at the beneficiary level. 4 FGDs (Focus Group Discussions) were conducted in 2 Unions.

### **3.5 Methods of Data Analysis**

The data has been processed by placing into tabular forms and various diagrams or charts. For statistical tests and analysis MS Excel has been applied. The qualitative information has been followed the descriptive discussions to answer the research question. Finally, results with summary and conclusion have been presented.

### **3.6 Reliability and Cross Validation of Data**

The primary data for this study has been collected from the respondents like the beneficiaries, non beneficiaries, Government officers, Union Parishad Chairman and members. Caswell and Miller (2000 cited in Caswell 2009, p.1910) opines that validity has been one of the important strengths of qualitative research. Validity refers to trustworthiness of data which is subject to the measurement of the phenomenon, research problem. Data gathered in this study are cross-checked with as many sources as possible with a view to ensure their validity and reliability.

## CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

**4.1 Introduction:** This chapter deals with analysis of the conceptual issues and then explanation of the approaches to policy implementation. This chapter also contains the analytical framework used in this study.

### 4.2 Conceptual Issues of Policy Implementation

Policy implementation refers to the activities that are carried out in the light of established Policies (Adamoleskun, 1983). According to Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: xiii-xv), "implementation means just what Webster [dictionary] and Roget [thesaurus] say it does: to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete." According to their seminal book on the subject: "Policies imply theories. Policies become programmes when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions are created. Implementation, then, is the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to obtain the desired result."

A more specific definition is provided by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 447-8): "Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions."

In an influential paper Rein and Rabinovitz (1978: 308) describes implementation as "the point at which intent gets translated into action." Their conceptual definition of implementation is "(1) a declaration of government preferences, (2) mediated by a number of actors who (3) create a circular process characterized by reciprocal power relations and negotiations." They see the "politics of implementation" as being an attempt to resolve conflicts between three imperatives: "the legal imperative to do what is legally required; the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible; and the consensual imperative to do what can establish agreement among contending influential parties who have a stake in the outcome."

In one of the few attempts to model implementation in developing countries, Merilee Grindle (1980a: 5-6) provides a generic definition: "[It] is an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the program

being pursued and by the interaction of the decision makers within a given politico-administrative context."

Paul Berman (1978) and Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) define implementation simply as the processes of carrying out an authoritative decision-i.e. a policy choice. On a similar note, Edwards (1980: 1) defines it as "the stage of policymaking between the establishment of a policy-such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects."

Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983: 4) concept of policy implementation is "those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive impacts on people and events." The 'working definition' employed by Hargrove (1983: 281) includes two components: "(a) the actions required by law are carried out; and (b) those actions encompass both formal compliance with the law and organizational routines consistent with compliance."

Despite the fact that there is reasonable consensus on the general meaning of the term (Berman, 1978: 159), the nuances of stress and scope within the definitions suggested by leading scholars-plus the tendency to propose new ones rather than using ones already proposed-suggests a field still searching for its boundaries within the larger discipline of policy science.

A widely accepted model of the causal processes of implementation still remains, what Hargrove (1975) had called the "missing link" in social policy. As Lester et al. (1987: 208-9) point out: Implementation research has been too restricted in time (i.e., an emphasis on cross-sectional versus longitudinal analysis), too restricted in number (i.e., an emphasis on case study versus comparative analyses), too restricted in policy type (i.e., an emphasis on single policy type versus multiple policy types), too restricted in defining the concept of implementation (i.e., limited to a single output measure versus multiple measures), and too restricted in approach (i.e., the utilization of either "top-down" or "bottom-up" approach versus both).

### **4.3 Approaches to Implementation**

Varied opinions exist as to the most appropriate approaches to policy implementation. Although various prominent paradigms are debated and practiced internationally, every country adopted their own approaches in executing the vast range of policies in Government. Naturally, the consequence is also varying degrees of success of policy implementation. It is noted that early scholars of policy science saw implementation merely as an administrative choice which, once policy had been legislated and the institutions mandated with administrative authority, would happen of and by it. This view has, however, been exposed. While the complexity inherent in implementation processes has been amply demonstrated, we are still nowhere near a widely accepted causal theory with predictive or prescriptive powers (Najam, 1995). Scholars such as Wildavsky began implementation research in the 1960s and 1970s; however, a common theory is still lacking. There is still some confusion about when implementation begins, when it ends, and how many types of implementation there are. In the literature on policy implementation several obstacles were identified in the way of successful policy implementation. However, there is also a surprising number of common findings as well as suggestions between scholars of implementation literature.

### **4.4 Three Generations of Implementation Research:**

Along in the line of implementation research for many years there are three generations who gave a scholarly thinking on this issue of implementation. There were also lots of opinions about the study of these researches. There were combination of critic and positive view about these studies.

The first ('classical') generation of thinking on the subject began with the assumption that implementation would happen 'automatically' once the appropriate policies had been authoritatively proclaimed.

Nakamura and Smallwood (1980:7-10) suggest that this 'classical' model of policy administration was based on three basic concepts which helped make the 'machine' the metaphor and model for the study of administration and helped foster the view that implementation was but an automatic cog within the rationalized administrative machine. The first was a Weberian framework of the ideal bureaucracy being a firmly ordered 'system' with highly rationalized, legalistic,

authoritarian, and hierarchical structures, where a small group of decision makers at the top create policy and subordinates at the bottom dutifully carry it out.

As Smith (1973: 198) points out, the assumption was that "once [an 'efficient'] policy has been 'made' by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by the policymakers."

The second ('empirical') generation set out to challenge this assumption, to explain implementation 'failure' in specific cases, and to demonstrate that implementation was a political process no less complex (and often more so) than policy formulation.

The limitations of the 'classical' model, however, began to be highlighted in the post World War-II period as it became apparent that public policy worked less as an efficient and orderly machine and more as a process of "muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959).

Scholarship in public administration and organizational behavior (e.g., Simon, 1947; Kaufman, 1960; Etozioni, 1964) was revealing that administrations and implementation were far more complex, and political, than the classical assumptions had suggested them to be.

The first generations of scholars were faulted for underestimating the complexity of implementation processes; the second generation set out to record the magnitude of this complexity through detailed empirical studies. Scholars of this generation meticulously documented specific case studies and showed how complex implementation really was and why it was a folly to assume that just because a policy had been proclaimed, it would be implemented.

While Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) are the most prominent exemplar of this genre of research, the general mood of this generation is caught by Bardach in the implementation Game (1977: 3):

It is hard enough to design public policies and Programmes that look good on paper. It is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients.

The third ('analytic') generation, by contrast, has been less concerned with specific implementation failure and more with understanding how implementation works in general and how its prospects might be improved.

The contribution of this generation of implementation research must not go underappreciated. Despite the fact that there remains a lack of cumulation or convergence in the field and that predictive implementation theory remains elusive, this generation of scholarship has substantially enhanced our understanding of the important clusters of variables that can impact implementation.

The debate between scholars of this generation has yielded a number of increasingly more refined analytic models of the implementation process, an extended list of potential explanatory variables, and at least two major theoretical streams of thought: 1) a top-down approach which begins with the central decision maker and the authoritative policy statement and proceeds downwards through the hierarchical administrative structure to examine the extent to which the policy's legally-mandated objectives were achieved and procedures followed; and 2) a bottom up approach which starts with an analysis of the many actors who interact at the operational (local) level and works backwards to map the outcomes and impacts of the policy in terms of the strategies adopted by the relevant actors in response to the particular policy choice.

As implementation research evolved, two schools of thought developed as to the most effective method for studying and describing implementation:

- (1) top-down and
- (2) bottom-up.

**Top-Down Approach:**

A top-down view exemplified the earlier analytic models and has remained the more dominant genre. Typically, this perspective starts from the authoritative policy decision at the central (top) level of government and asks: a) to what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?; b) to what extent were the objectives attained over time?; c) what were the principal factors



affecting policy outputs and impacts?; and d) how was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? (Sabatier, 1986: 22).

Probably the most influential articulation of the top-down perspective comes from Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier (1983). In searching for the principal variables that affect implementation, Mazmanian and Sabatier (pp.20-39) list a total of sixteen factors, clustered into three broad categories a) tractability of the problems (i.e. "some social problems are simply much easier to deal with than others"); b) ability of policy decision to structure implementation (i.e. "original policymakers can substantially affect the attainment of legal objectives by utilizing the levers at their disposal"); and c) nonstatutory variables affecting implementation (i.e. "implementation also has an inherent political dynamism of its own").

Mazmanian and Sabatier then go on to synthesize this large set of variables into a shorter list of six "sufficient and generally necessary" conditions for the effective implementation of legal objectives: a) clear and consistent objectives; b) adequate causal theory; c) legal structure to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups; d) committed and skillful implementing officials; e) support of interest groups and sovereigns; and f) changes in socio-economic conditions which do not substantially undermine political support or causal theory.

#### **4.5 Factors Involved in Implementation Problem:**

According to the view derived from the first generation of implementation researcher who identified the implementation process to be an easier one was contradicted by many scholars and various complexities were identified in the implementation process by the second generation scholars. Many factors were identified by the third generation scholars which proved to be very crucial in case of implementation difficulties. There were factors which were common for the developed and developing countries and some were found to be more problematic or adverse for the developing countries.

Marilee Grindle viewed implementation principally as a political process which involves interactions between varieties of actors at a variety of levels; this model considers the content and context of policy as the critical clusters of variables that influence implementation.

Scharpf pointed out that it is unlikely if not impossible, that public policy of any significance could result from the choice process of any single unified factor .Policy formation and Policy implementation are inevitably the results of interactions among a plurality of separate actors with separate interests , goals and strategies..

Understandings of the implementation from the notion of Hanf build on the works of different scholars which implies that “implementation involves processes in which different actors find it necessary to act within a given set of unavoidable (even if potentially changeable) constraints”.

The purpose of implementation research, then, is to “reconstruct the patterns of interaction and interrelationships among those actors through which information is communicated, cooperation established, and conflicts resolved” (Hanf,1982:160).

Grindle (1980b) provided a detailed description of the criticality of the administrator-as-implementer to the success of implementation. She defines implementers as “a corps of mid-level officials who have responsibility for implementing programmes in a specific, relatively constricted area who are held responsible for programme results by their superiors [who maintain] frequent contact with national or regional superiors, but also [have] occasion to interact with the clients of government agencies and with opponents of the programmes at local levels... [and] may have considerable discretion in pursuing their tasks.

In definition and analysis about the role of implementers, Grindle’s view was that: Among a variety of factors that determine whether or not programmes formulated at the national level will reach their intended beneficiaries is the performance of the field administrator as implementer. Whether or not he responds to the expectation that he execute programmes depends upon the force of other demands made upon him as well as his own perceptions of how best to achieve his personal goals. Whatever they may be. (Grindle, 1980b:221).

Warwick’s view is that: Implementation means transaction to carry out a programme; implementers must continually deal with tasks, environments, clients, and each other. The formalities of organization and the mechanics of administration are important as background, but the key to success is continual coping with contexts, personalities, alliances, and events. And

crucial to such adaptation is the willingness to acknowledge and correct mistakes, to shift directions, and to learn from doing. Nothing is more vital to implementation than self-correction; nothing more lethal than blind preservation (Warwick, 1982:190).

#### **4.6 Implementation Problem in Developing Countries:**

The scholars of implementation research have mentioned that there are much similarities in the broad factors which have impact on implementation. One of the most important thing is that, even where the broad factors identified as being important are similar, implementation problems encountered in developing countries are hypothesized to be greater by virtue of the political and social context in which implementation occurs-that is, in Migdal's (1988) terms: "Strong societies and Weak states."

Although built (and tested) on evidence from developing countries, the models proposed by Grindle and Warwick are not suggested exclusively from them. Implicit to both is the view that the assumptions, variables, and relationships identified are applicable to social policy implementation societies, but most so in developing countries. An important subtext is that implementation is likely to be more difficult in developing country situations than in industrialized countries. For example, Grindle(1980a:19)concludes that "given the concentration of political activity on the implementation process, it is likely that policies and programs will be even more difficult to manage and predict and even more subject to alteration in the third world than elsewhere".

That is, the complex variables that impact implementation tend to be all the more complex in developing countries. Why this is so is best understood in light of Joel Migdal's (1988) conception of developing countries being weak states with strong societies. "In every state, there is bound to be ....a 'leakage of authority' as policy moves through an agency. Where accountability and control have been crippled and where the big shuffle or similar means have consumed leaders at the top....that leakage can turn into a massive hemorrhage".

Critical to Migdal's conceptualization is, what he calls, the Triangle of Accommodation between implementers, politicians and local strongmen. Building on Grindle's (1980b) earlier work he

points out that “implementers have been strategically placed between the top policy making elements of the state and most of the country’s population. They have been the key switchmen in moving state resources originating in the main stations, the capital city, along the tracks to the villages, towns and cities all over the country” (p239). A major contribution of this work is to demonstrate that the influence of local conditions and actors is likely to be far greater in weak states (developing countries) than in strong ones. This is so because, on the one hand, the politics of survival diminishes accountability and control at the apex and, on the other, the powerless masses are often “frozen by fear” (p244). Migdal (1988:248-9) argues, therefore, that: Explicit or covert bargaining among organized interests, bureaucrats and politicians is a hallmark of nearly every contemporary state .....[the] distortion of the intent of policy makers is limited, however because of the scrutiny from superiors and the potential clamoring of clients who would stand to lose by any changes in adopted policy. In weak states, such constraints are far more feeble, and the bargaining can lead to major distortions in the use of state resources. Anemic supervision due to the politics of survival and the powerlessness of potential clients of reformist policies leave the bargaining among implementers, peer politicians, and strongmen much less encumbered by the power of state officials from above or by the demands of the mass of the population from below. The Triangle of Accommodation can [thus] become a set of institutionalized relationships with only occasional infringement from other forces.

Migdal argues, “The structure of society has an important indirect effect on policy implementation.” In his fascinating study of state-society relationships in developing countries- which he characterizes as strong societies and weak states- he finds that:

Societies structure [affects] politics at the highest levels of the state and the administration of state policy at much lower levels. If we want to understand the capabilities and character of states –their ability to make rules for their population and the degree to which the politics of survival predominate over other agenda items-we must start with social structure. (Migdal, 1988:256)

He concluded that policy implementation by state agents in weak state is more prone to the deflection of in the face of fragmented societies and the politics of survival is more focused on developing countries, the general statement above is useful for all societies. The importance of

being sensitive to the larger social, cultural, political and legal structure in which implementation takes place is further highlighted in the work of Marilee Grindle (1980: 14).

The process of implementation may vary considerably depending upon whether the political regime is an authoritarian one or a more open system where elections impose a greater degree of responsiveness on both political and administrative officials .... Matters of ideology, culture, political alliances and payoffs, and international events are other environmental influences that may also have considerable impact on the administrative process. Moreover programmes are not implemented in isolation from other public policies: a programme's success may easily be affected by the priorities of political officials or the outcome of other programmes these factors imply that programmes identical in content may still be implemented differently if the context in which they are pursued differs substantially.

This, more elaborate, understanding of the criticality of policy content is best exemplified in the path breaking work of Pressman and Wildavsky(1973:xv) who view implementation as “a seamless web...a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them. “Mediating this choice of ends and means is the content of the policy.

A systematic discussion of the context variable comes from Grindle (1980). She defined context a) power, interests, and strategies of actors involved; b) institutions and regime characteristics; c) compliance and responsiveness have great importance in implementation.

Warwick (1982: 182) viewed that “the most common difference between programmes that are carried out and those that fail is that the former link policy intentions to environmental realities whereas the latter proceed as if the environment were either invariant or irrelevant.”

To facilitate a meaningful understanding of implementation, at least three related tasks concerning the institutional context need to be performed: a) to identify the key institutional actors influencing, or being influenced by, the process b) to trace the interests and power relationships between and within the relevant institutions c) and to recognize the institutional characteristics as influenced by the overarching structure of social, economic, political and legal setting in which they operate.

Different writers mentioned that –the actors must be the unit of analysis. This implies that “implementation involves processes in which different actors find it necessary to act within a given set of unavoidable (even if potentially changeable) constraints (Hanf, 1982, 166). As Hjern and Hull (1982:114) point out, that as the very first step we need to be “clear about who participates how and with that effect in policy processes..... All empirically relevant actors need to be incorporated in on equal terms in implementation researcher’s reconstruction of policy systems. The view of implementation research “reconstruct the patterns of interaction and interrelationships among those actors through which information is communicated, co-operation is established, and conflicts resolved” (Hanf, 1982:160).

### **Patronage and Corruption:**

Patronage and Corruption are very much interrelated. They are so much intertwined that sometimes it is very difficult to differentiate between these two. Political patronage and Political corruption in particular are contributing in majority cases behind deviation from what policy suggests. D’Oleo suggested that “Patronage has a detrimental effect on policy design, implementation, management and overall performance by adulterating its noble public service objective with downright vulgar and capricious self-serving schemes”. (D’Oleo J.J, 2012).

D’Oleo also argued that public policy in its purest form yields common goods that ameliorate the quality of life of society at large. Power politics, however, tend to defile it. In the context of a system rife with patronage, public policy is fashioned in close alignment with the interests of a particular individual, political party, social or economic sector. Since patronage consists of using public resources to garner political support, the policy agenda emanating from it is inherently biased and perverse. Consequently, patronage appointments to the public sector result in public policies that are oftentimes focused on spending rather than infrastructure investment, highly politicized and lacking in accountability at virtually every level (D’Oleo J.J, 2012).

Like many other developed and developing countries in the world, in Bangladesh there are also lots of implementation problems. Many of the government policy decisions can not reach the desired destination due to many factors as have been mentioned above. Many factors are responsible behind noncompliance of the policy decision taken from the government. As part of

the broad factors, factors like patronage, corruption etc. contributing to a large extent to the deviation from what policy recommends in Bangladesh. These types of irregular activities are widely prevalent in Bangladesh, as Zafarullah and Siddiquee (2001) has argued that-“ the public sector of Bangladesh became ineffective due to different forms of corrupt practices including misappropriation of funds, rent-seeking, bribery and deviation from the administrative ethics.”

The prevalence of corrupt practice and its consequences are mentioned in the following articles also-

“It is usually known that almost all kinds of corruption perpetuate in politics and administration in Bangladesh”. The most common form of corruption is pecuniary bribes (Taslim, 1994). “Other forms of corruption are: abuse of authority, nepotism, favoritism, fraud, patronage, theft and deceit. In many cases forms of corruptions are intertwined with their consequences” (Khan, 1998).

Some damaging consequences of corruption are taking place in Bangladesh context as the World Bank suggests: “undermines public confidence in government; engenders wrong economic choices and constrains government’s ability to implement policies; makes the poor pay the price” (World Bank 1996a: 66).


The present study makes an attempt to identify how the factors like patronage, corruption had affected the proper selection of beneficiaries and hence, played roles in the effectiveness of the implementation of the Widow Allowance Programme in Bangladesh.

#### **4.7 Concept from Top-Down Approach**

As it has been found from Top-Down approach that it is an approach started with a policy decision and examined the extent to which its legally mandated objectives are achieved over time. The most popular framework known as Policy Implementation Framework (PIF) of Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian has been applied here. This framework applies a number of statutory and non-statutory variables to five identified stages in the policy implementation process.

## Policy Implementation Framework

Modified from Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983. Implementation and Public Policy. Used from Elson R. Peter 2006.



**The Policy Implementation Framework (PIF) of Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian addresses particular policy implementation issues such as:**

- (1) The extent to which the implementing officials and target groups act consistently with the objectives and procedures outlined in the policy decision;
- (2) The extent to which policy objectives are attained;
- (3) The principal factors affecting policy outcomes and impacts; and
- (4) The policy's reformulation, if any. In addition, the PIF conceptual framework provides a broader socioeconomic context in which policy implementation issues can be addressed. (Rownak, 2010)



#### **4.8 Applicability of the Concept of Top-Down Approach to Present Study**

The present study is an attempt to assess the Widow Allowance Programme from the supply side perspectives. The implementation of this programme is expected to be based on the implementation guideline provided by the government for the programme.

The concept goes with the main spirit of Top-Down approach, where it has been stated that Top-Down approach started with a policy decision (the implementation guideline) and the present study focused on the issues like-

- (1) The extent to which the implementing officials act consistently with the Objectives and procedures outlined in the policy decision;*
- (2) To assess the roles played by different factors & actors and their interaction and interplay at different stages of implementation.*

All the above mentioned issues seemed to be directly or indirectly linked with the Top-Down policy implementation framework described by Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian. As have been identified by the scholars of implementation research the actors and factors responsible for noncompliance of the policy decision, this study is an attempt to identify the actors and factors. Taking the concept from the top down approach to satisfy the relation some dependent and independent variables are selected.

In this study the dependent variable is the effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme and the operational definition of effectiveness is given in section 4.8.

The independent variables in this study are-

- 1) Patronage and Corruption**
- 2) Nature of Organizational Practices**
- 3) Strength of the Policy design**

#### **4.9 Operational Definition:**

##### **(a) Effectiveness**

Effectiveness in this study means consistent act of the implementing officials based on the implementation policy guideline with regards to the selection of beneficiaries of the Widow Allowance Programme.

##### **(b) Patronage and Corruption:**

**Patronage** is the support, encouragement, privilege, or financial aid that an organization or individual bestows to another. As well, the term may refer to a type of corruption or favoritism in which a party in power rewards groups, families, ethnicities for their electoral support using illegal gifts or fraudulently-awarded appointments or government contracts. In some countries the term is used to describe political patronage, which is the use of state resources to reward individuals for their electoral support.


##### **Corruption:**

The shorter definition of corruption includes "abuse of authority, bribery, favouritism, extortion, fraud, patronage, theft, deceit, malfeasance and illegality" (Caiden, 1991a). Political corruption is "the behaviour of (elected) public officials which diverges from the formal components - the duties and powers, rights and obligations - of a public role to seek private gain" (Kramer, 1997). Administrative corruption is defined as "the institutionalized personal abuse of public resources by civil servants" (Gould, 1991). In both cases public officials (elected and appointive) can convert public office into private gain in many ways.

From the two definitions, the above two terms are shown to be closely related. They are sometimes intertwined with one another. In this study patronage and corruption will be discussed interchangeably and they are defined as "use of public resources by public officials (elected and appointive) into private gain".

#### 4.10 Analytical Framework:

Depending on the theoretical discussion an analytical framework for this study has been drawn below



**1) Patronage and Corruption:** There are certain procedures for beneficiary selection mentioned in the guidelines. Such as-invite application for allowance through proper circulation, application in appropriate form, committee formation for selection, enlistment by following certain criteria. The study will find out how these procedures are being followed in the study areas. The study will also intend to see whether factor like Patronage and Corruption have any impact on selection of beneficiaries.

#### 2) Nature of Organizational Practices:

- **Monitoring and Supervision:** Implementation guideline provides the provision for certain committees and personnel who are to be responsible for monitoring, evaluating and supervising the programme and give necessary direction to the implementing officials. The study will examine whether the supervision is done as per the implementation guideline and whether this has any impact on selection procedure.

- **Coordination:** Coordination between the concerned offices takes place through informal and formal process. Formal process such as meetings, correspondence through letters will be considered here. Guidelines provide the provisions for number of meetings to be held, their timings and the people who are to be involved. The study will assess whether the coordination is done as per the implementation guideline and whether this has any impact on selection procedure.
- **Training:** The study will examine whether the implementing officials were given training about how to conduct the selection process, whether they were educated enough about the policy guideline.

**3) Strength of the Policy Design:** The study intended to see whether the selection criteria for qualifying as beneficiary mentioned in the guideline are clearly defined, whether there is any ambiguity, contradiction and inadequacy in the policy design with special reference to the selection process.

These are the independent variables which will be measured in terms of the measurable indicators to measure the effectiveness that is the implementation effectiveness in terms of selection of beneficiaries of the Widow Allowance programme.

#### 4.11 Variables and Indicators:

Independent variables		Sources of verification data/ information
Patronage and Corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Criteria following</li> <li>• Maintenance of different stages</li> <li>• Verification process</li> <li>• Circulation and application</li> </ul>	Inspection report, monitoring report, beneficiary list, existing documents in the office, questionnaire survey, interview, FGD
Nature of Organizational Practices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring and Supervision</li> <li>• Coordination</li> <li>• Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspection report, monitoring report, direction letter, questionnaire survey, interview</li> <li>• Meeting minutes, correspondence letters, questionnaire survey, interview</li> <li>• Interview, questionnaire survey.</li> </ul>
Strength of the Policy Design:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defining selection criteria</li> <li>• Contradiction in clauses</li> <li>• Any inadequacy</li> </ul>	Analysis of policy guideline, questionnaire survey, interview
<b>Dependent variable</b>		
Effectiveness of the Programme	Selection of beneficiaries as per the guideline <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Correct beneficiaries are selected.</li> <li>• Selection done in exact manner</li> </ul>	Existing documents in the office, questionnaire survey, interview, FGD

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOCIAL SAFETY NET PROGRAMMES IN BANGLADESH: AN OVERVIEW

#### **5.1 Introduction:**

Social Safety Net Programmes(SSNPs) are thought to be an effective measure for reducing poverty for a developing country like Bangladesh where a vital portion of its population living below poverty line. The principle goal in the economic policy of the government of Bangladesh is to reduce poverty of the people living below the poverty line in a short period of time by developing home grown poverty reduction strategies (PRs) along with operational plans suited to the particular circumstances and needs of Bangladesh. SSNPs have been given utmost importance and have been undertaken by successive governments, including the present government, to deal with risks, poverty and vulnerability faced by the disadvantaged population groups.

Social Safety Nets (SSNs) are noncontributory Programmes that target the poor and vulnerable section of population and are designed to reduce poverty and inequality, enable better human capital investments, improve social risk management, and offer social protection. They are a subset of a wider collection of policies that constitute a typical poverty reduction strategy, and are often implemented alongside contributory social insurance, social investments in health and education, land redistribution, and microfinance, and so forth. This chapter is an attempt to go through some of the important Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh.

#### **5.2 Introduction of the Concept of “Social Safety Net”:**

The concept of ‘social safety net’ came from the broader term ‘social protection’. In chronological order, safety net came first into the discourse during the 1980’s in response to the (presumably short-term) adverse effects of structural adjustment (Adato, Ahmed and Lund, 2004 cited in Zohir, S. et al., 2010). The concept was later popularized in East Asia during the financial crisis (Paitoonpong et al, 2008; cited in Zohir, S. et al., 2010). Safety net is a concept that is largely associated with the idea of a short-term buffer. Although the term ‘social safety

net' was adopted in the 1980s, programmes of similar nature (albeit not termed as such) have long been in practice. Some examples include rural works program, relief to areas adversely affected by natural calamity, etc. With globalization giving rise to sporadic bouts of crises world wide, new experiences were acquired during the 1990's, which subsequently led to the extension of the concept of short term safety net to longer term interventions, often coined as social protection. During that period of time the developing partners were also very much concern about these. They wanted to deal with matters related to public policy, which involved multidimensional interventions with increasing emphasis on human rights. Thus, pressure was often created on national governments to include pro-poor polices in their budget and public policy. There was clearly a shift in focus, or rather, widening of the focus – the importance of 'safety nets' during the 1980s giving way to 'social protection' during the 1990s. Social protection had long been considered an issue of domestic concern in developed countries, where institutional arrangements emerged in order to protect citizens against risk and provide assistance to the destitute (Norton et al, 2001; cited in Zohir, S. et al., 2010). In the context of the developing world, social protection is a new term that expands from the concept of short-term Safety Net Programmes, and emphasizes a longer-term development approach, which includes social assistance and insurance (Page et al,2005; cited in Zohir, S. et al., 2010 ).

### **5.3 Major Social Safety Net Programmes in Bangladesh:**

Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNPs) are a set of public measures, which a society provides for its members to protect them from various types of economic and social hardships, resulting from a substantial decline in income due to various types of natural and man made contingencies. The people encounter different types of difficulties such as loss of cultivable land, crop failure, land and homestead loss due to river erosion, unemployment, sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age or death of earning household members. SSNPs are, therefore, essential measures to address: (a) risks, i.e., uncertain events which may adversely affect people's wellbeing; (b) poverty, i.e., not having enough of something valuable to derive income and livelihood; and (c) vulnerability, i.e., the probability at present of not having enough of something valuable in future.

SSNPs actually cover three different groups who face various types of shocks and risks. These include: (i) the chronic poor, i.e., those who are poor even during “good times,” because they have limited access to assets and income to manage risks and even small reductions in their assets and income can have serious adverse consequences for them; (ii) the transient poor, i.e., those who live close to the poverty line and could fall into poverty when an individual household or the economy as a whole faces hardships; and (iii) other vulnerable population groups for whom general stability and prosperity alone would not be sufficient such as the disabled and divorced/separated/widowed women without access to any regular employment or help from others. Thus, given the types of shocks and risks, it is appropriate that SSNPs follow both the “promotion approach” which is undertaken to raise the incomes and employment opportunities of the poor and the “protection approach” which is undertaken to reduce the vulnerability of the poor (Khuda, 2011)

The poor people in Bangladesh can not address and cope with risk when they confront with any natural or man made shock. Due to the impact of globalization, the nature of shock and its dimensions are also changing. Sometimes the situation becomes so adverse that it becomes irresistible by the poverty prone countries like Bangladesh. SSNPs help the poor individuals and households to use their existing resources more effectively, and thereby helping them to cope with these various types of risks. The population is rising each year at a substantial rate but employment and opportunity for work is not increasing at that rate. At the same time, the opportunity in the agricultural sector is also decreasing day after day. All these factors are pressing the livelihood of poor people into immense pressure.

Due to lack of any income source, poor people in rural area can hardly maintain a minimum standard of life. It is unthinkable for them to get other opportunities of life and to make savings for the future. From these perspectives, SSNPs provide some sort of support to the marginalized people to get access to essential services such as health, water and sanitation, education and adequate nutrition; help to create assets at individual, household and community levels; in cash or kind or both, paid to the poor and vulnerable population groups to provide them with a minimum income security and access to various essential services (ILO and WHO, 2009).



The Social Safety Net measures are broadly divided into four types: (i) provision of special allowances for the various underprivileged sections of the population, so that the poor and disadvantaged people can tackle the poverty effectively; (ii) employment generation through micro-credit and different fund management programmes; (iii) food security based activities to better manage the consequences of natural disasters; and (iv) provision of education, health and training to make the new generation more capable and self-reliant (Rawnak,2010).

These four broad categories can be divided into two types, depending on the mode of payment:

(a) Cash transfers, including conditional and non conditional cash transfers (Food-for-Education Programme, Primary Education Stipend Programme, Female Secondary School Assistance Project, Old Age Allowance, Widow Allowance and Rural Maintenance Programme); and

(b) Food transfers (Food-for Work Programme, Vulnerable Group Development Programme, Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme, Test Relief and Gratuitous Relief).

Cash transfer programmes which include conditional and unconditional cash transfer programme are actually contributing to give support to the poor household. The concept of Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programme is a very popular form of transfer which took off from Latin America and is being considered as a popular tool for poverty eradication. The transfers are targeted to selected households with conditions for developing human capabilities through education and health related programmes. Certain advantages of CCTs made it a better choice for the policymaker to incorporate this in SSNP. These programmes provide families an opportunity for developing their skills as well as to decide where they want to spend ensuring better allocation of resources. It also helps to overcome problems of information asymmetries and address gender related problems. Through CCTs poor are better reached compared to the subsidy programmes as they are less prone to error in inclusion. CCTs are often responsible for creating multiple effects on the communities where the programmes are conducted (World Bank

2003). Moreover CCT programs can influence the income level of the poor in the short run and improve human capabilities in the medium and long run. Such programmes can also help to avoid price distortions created by government subsidy programmes. However, sometimes the infrastructural as well as administrative constricts of the low-income economies may lead to failure in implementing conditional transfer programmes. However, it is often said that CCTs despite covering a large number of population do not contribute highly in poverty reduction.

To address different types of vulnerabilities different varieties of SSNPs are strategically applied. The different types of programmes are applied to areas where it best suit and applicable to address different vulnerability issues. That is the government is looking for its best to apply the right programme at a right place. Along with CCTs, the unconditional cash transfer programmes are applied in many vulnerability areas as these programmes can be useful in influencing the income level of the poor. Studies show when direct transfers are made, particularly to women, their choices for consumption varies which affect the children of the poor families. An example of such programme is the Child Support Grant (CSG) programme in South Africa. The grant is provided to the primary care giver (usually the mother) of the child in order to ensure that the benefit is enjoyed by the child. The unconditional transfers are required in time of emergency such as flood, drought, cyclone, etc (Devereux 2002).

When it comes to a choice between cash or kind while choosing the mode of transfers, it is often argued that in kind transfers do not succeed in bringing back missing entitlements. Cash can restore people's dignity. Cash provides greater choice to households on their consumption decision. In distributional terms, cash is cheaper and faster compared to commodities such as food, seed, etc. Moreover, cash helps people to exploit local markets and meet a variety of needs and leaves an option for investment in order to earn a livelihood. Cash also empowers women as well as marginalized groups in the society (Witteveen 2006).

Cash transfer is often supported for ensuring complete consumer sovereignty. While in kind transfers leave the consumers with limited choice, cash transfers let the household choose what they want to consume (Gentilini 2007). There are some limitations on choosing the target group and the possibility was there that the cash provided through a safety net programme bears the

risk of being wasted in other purposes without the benefit directly being utilized by the family. Studies suggest that such situations may particularly arise when cash transfers are directed towards the male of the households. For this reason, a large number of the Safety Net Programmes provides cash transfer to the females as their choices are presumed to be more beneficial for the family, particularly the children.

However, no matter whatever argument exists related to whether Safety Net Programmes should take the form of cash or kind, whether direct transfers are better than indirect ones, whether conditional programmes help reduce poverty compared to unconditional programmes, the success of any programme would solely depend on how factors like cost effectiveness and efficiency, administrative capacity, market assessment, and programme objectives are suitable for the country where the programme will take place. Impact of these programmes solely depends on how well they can be implemented in the context of the relevant country. Success of the programme will be measured by its success in alleviating poverty (Iqbal, 2008).

In Bangladesh both cash and in kind transfers are in operation. In requirement for addressing poverty situations of such huge portions of marginalized people conditional and unconditional cash transfer, both types of programme are functioning where the cash transfer is performing the dominant role than in kind transfer in eradication of poverty mostly at the poverty stricken rural areas.

The main safety net programmes can be divided into two broad categories - those that provide cash transfers and those that provide food in-kind transfers. The major safety net programmes in Bangladesh are as follows:

<b>Cash Transfer Programmes</b>			
<b>Name of the Programme</b>	<b>Major objectives of the Programme</b>	<b>Targeting criteria</b>	<b>Administration/Financers</b>
Primary Education Stipend Project (PESP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing the number of children into primary school from poor family <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing attendance to and reduce dropout from the primary school <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing the rate of completion of primary education cycle <input type="checkbox"/> Controlling child labour and reducing poverty <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing the quality of primary education	<input type="checkbox"/> Destitute woman headed family. <input type="checkbox"/> Principal occupation of household head is day labour <input type="checkbox"/> Family of low income professionals (such as: fishing, pottery, blacksmithing, weaving and cobbling). <input type="checkbox"/> Landless or households that own 0.50 acres of land (marginal or share Cropper).	<input type="checkbox"/> Department of Primary Education, Ministry of education <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB
Female Secondary School Assistance Programme (FSSAP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Increasing the number of students in the secondary school <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing their prospect as	<input type="checkbox"/> All unmarried girl students studying in recognized institutions at secondary level	<input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Education <input type="checkbox"/> Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB,

	<p>employees and of self employment</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Controlling under age marriage</p>		<p>USAID, Asia Foundation, NORAD, World Bank, ADB</p>
<p>Old Age Allowances</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Providing old age cash allowances to the poor</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> At least 65 years of age</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Income not more than TK.2000 per year</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Must not have worked in the formal sector</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Based Upon the category of the Union, number of beneficiary is identified</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 50% men and 50% women</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Department of Social Services</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB</p>
<p>Widow Allowance Programme</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Providing widowed and husband deserted distressed women with monetary support</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Priority must be given to the old aged widow and husband deserted destitute women.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Priority must be given to the wealth less, homeless and landless respectively</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Priority must be given to women with under sixteen</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Department of Social Services</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB</p>

		years two children.	
Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP)	<input type="checkbox"/> Empowerment of Women <input type="checkbox"/> Maintaining rural infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 30 decimals of land <input type="checkbox"/> Destitute family Circumstances. <input type="checkbox"/> Female heads of households of 18-35 Years of age. Widowed or separated at least one year, with priority to those with more dependants. <input type="checkbox"/> No other income and not be participating in other targeted programme.	<input type="checkbox"/> Department of Local Government and Engineering, CARE Bangladesh <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB, EC, CIDA, Union Parishads
Fund for Rehabilitation of Acid Burnt Women and the Physically Handicapped	<input type="checkbox"/> Assisting acid burnt women and disabled through provisions of credit and skills training <input type="checkbox"/> Creating opportunities for IGA <input type="checkbox"/> Raising social awareness	<input type="checkbox"/> Installation of facility. <input type="checkbox"/> Generally based upon case.	<input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Women and Children's affairs <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB
<b>Food Transfer Programmes</b>			
Food for work (FFW)	<input type="checkbox"/> Employment Generation for the poor, mainly in the	<input type="checkbox"/> Functionally landless. <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of productive assets. <input type="checkbox"/> Generally women headed	<input type="checkbox"/> Department of Local Government Eng. Dept;

	<p>dry season through infrastructure creation and maintenance</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Developing and maintaining rural infrastructure</p>	<p>households where women are widowed, deserted and destitute.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Day labour or temporary worker</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Income less than tk.300 per month.</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Department of social Services;</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other departments.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB, ADB, WFP</p>
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Increasing the marketable efficiency of women through training, motivating savings for initial capital accumulation and providing scope for availing credit</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Building social awareness on disaster management and nutrition through training in groups.</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Household with not more than 15 acres of land.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Training totaling about 150 hours.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Monthly household income less than tk.300; dependent upon seasonal wage employment.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Women of reproductive age (18-49).</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Day labour or temporary worker.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Lack of productive assets.</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitations</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB, WFP, EC, Canada, and Australia.</p>
Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Provide calamity related emergency needs</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Short term relief to disaster victims in</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Generally a location is targeted based on the occurrence of natural disaster.</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Food and Disaster Management</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB and some</p>

	terms of food and basic necessities.		Development Partners
Test Relief (TR)	<input type="checkbox"/> employment for the poor in the rainy season <input type="checkbox"/> developing and maintaining rural infrastructure <input type="checkbox"/> compared to FFW lighter labour equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> Generally a location is targeted.	<input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Food and Disaster Management <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB and some Development Partners
Gratuitous Relief (GR)	<input type="checkbox"/> Provides in calamity related emergency needs <input type="checkbox"/> Short term relief to disaster victims in terms of food and basic necessities.	<input type="checkbox"/> Generally a location is targeted based on the occurrence of natural disaster.	<input type="checkbox"/> Ministry of Food and Disaster Management <input type="checkbox"/> Financed by GoB and some Development Partners

**Source:** World Bank, 2008

The present government has placed elimination of poverty and inequity at the forefront of its development strategy. The aim is to bring down the poverty rate from 40 percent to 15 per cent by 2021. Investment in infrastructure, creation of employment opportunities during slack seasons, and increased coverage of Social Safety Net Programmes have been given more importance to improve poverty situation; and priority has been given to activities targeting the extreme poor, women in poverty, landless poor and other disadvantaged groups. A strong and



expanded Social Safety Net is the main emphasis of the present government's vision to protect the poor from all types of social, economic and natural shocks (GoB, 2009). In the FY2010-11 budget, the government allocated 14.8 per cent of the total budget (compared to 15.2 per cent in the previous budget) and 2.5 per cent of the total GDP (compared to 2.25 per cent in the previous budget) for social security and social empowerment (GoB, budget document, 2010).

#### **5.4 Allocation for Widow Allowance Programme:**

During inception of the widow allowance programme the total allotment was 12.5 crore, number of beneficiaries was I lakh and monthly allowance was 100 taka. With the passage of time gradual expansion of the programme occurred and now in 2011-12 the total allotment has been increased to 331.20 crore taka, the number of beneficiaries increased up to 9.2 lakh and the monthly allowance reached up to 300 taka.

The year wise statistics of the distribution of the Widow Allowance since inception is given below-

<b>Financial year</b>	<b>Number of beneficiaries(in lakh)</b>	<b>Allowance per month(taka)</b>	<b>Total allocation of fund (in crore taka)</b>
1999-2000	1.0	100	12.5
2000-01	2.1	100	25
2001-02	2.1	100	25
2002-03	2.7	125	40
2003-04	5.0	150	90
2004-05	6.0	165	118.80
2005-06	6.25	180	135
2006-07	6.5	200	156
2007-08	7.5	220	158
2008-09	9.0	250	270
2009-10	9.20	300	331.20
2010-11	9.20	300	331.20
2011-12	9.20	300	331.20

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare, GoB, 2012

## **5.5 Conclusion:**

Safety Net Programmes of Bangladesh give special consideration for the vulnerable groups within the poor. These groups include aged poor people, widowed or deserted women, disabled persons and others. In Bangladesh, Safety Net Programmes also provide support to the insolvent or wounded freedom fighters. There is well justification in support of programmes targeting the vulnerable groups like aged, widowed and others and there is also scope for targeted cash transfers within the specific groups. These groups are generally accepted, even demanded, by the society as deserving candidates of support with recognition of correlation between poverty and their vulnerability.

## **CHAPTER SIX: WIDOW ALLOWANCE PROGRAMME IN BANGLADESH: AN OVERVIEW**

### **6.1 Introduction:**

Considering the miserable conditions encountered by the poor widowed, divorced, separated and abandoned women in a poverty ridden male dominated society of Bangladesh, in 1998, the then government of Bangladesh took an initiative to render some help to these women. This chapter sheds light on the overview of the Widow Allowance Programme in Bangladesh. It also focuses on the goals, objectives of the programme, selection Criteria followed for the beneficiaries, the methods of allowance distribution and the operational aspects of different committees involved in selection process.

### **6.2 Coverage of the Allowance Programme:**

The widowed, divorced women were distributed initially a lump-sum grant of Tk100 each from the prime ministers relief and rehabilitation fund and 10 most deserving women from all rural “ward” received this benefit. This act was repeated in 1999 too, but later a realization emerged that such ad hoc nature of assistance will hardly help these women to solve their problem. It rather requires a sustained effort. This realization subsequently led to the introduction of regular monthly Allowance Programme for country’s destitute women in line with the “old age allowance” programme for elderly people and the programme was formalized in September 1999.

In the beginning, this programme covered only rural parts and “C” category urban centers of the country but later the government expanded the programme and expansion took place in each year in terms of both coverage and monthly amount of allowance. Now in 2011-12, the monthly amount was increased to Tk.300. and number of beneficiaries was increased to 9.2 lakh.

### **6.3 Selection Criteria:**

- (i) Allowance recipient must be the citizen of Bangladesh.
- (ii) Priority must be given to the widow, divorced women, husband deserted women.
- (iii) Priority must be given to the old aged widow and husband deserted destitute women
- (iv) Priority must be given to the wealth less, homeless and landless respectively.
- (v) Priority must be given to the widow, divorced women, husband deserted women with 2 children under 16 years of age.

### **6.4 Non- Eligibility:**

- (i) Pension holder of the Government Service will not be eligible to get the said allowance.
- (ii) VGD Card holders will not be eligible to get the said allowance.
- (iii) Those who get regular grant or Allowance from the government will not be eligible to get the said allowance.
- (iv) Those who get regular grant or Allowance from the Non-government agencies will not be eligible to get the said allowance.

### **6.5. Implementing Agency:**

The Department of Social Services under the Ministry of Social Welfare has been implementing the Allowance Programme for the Widow and Husband Deserted Women through the National Advisory committee, Upazila committee and Ward Committee. The Allowances are disbursed through Banking Channel.

### **6.6 Impact:**

Through this programme extreme poverty is eroding from the target group. With the regular commutation between government officials, public representatives and other stake holders through this programme violence, oppression and negligence to the women especially in the rural areas are diminishing. Rights of the Widow and Husband's Deserted Destitute Women have been established through this programme.

**Goal:** To improve the economic and social condition of the poor and helpless widowed and husband deserted distressed women and to mitigate their vulnerability.

**Main Objectives:**

The main objectives of this programme are to empower poor widowed and distressed women through financial support and to improve the widowed women's status both within the family and in the society.

**Main Stakeholders/Partners**

Initially the Ministry of Social Welfare was responsible for implementing the programme. Then it was transferred to the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs' and at last, in 2009 the programme again returned to the Ministry of Social Welfare. At the field level, besides the line ministry field level officials, the local representatives and local administration is involved in the implementation process.

**Geographical Coverage:**

This programme is in operation throughout the whole country

**Target Group:**

Poor widowed and husband deserted distressed women have been targeted through this programme.

**Project Period:**

The programme has been operational since September 1999 till to date.

## **6.7 Method of Implementation:**

Initially the Ministry of Social Welfare had been given the responsibility to implement the programme. In the financial year 2003-04, the responsibility was handed over to the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs. Again, the programme was transferred from that Ministry to the Ministry of Social Welfare. One committee has been formed under the leadership of the honorable minister of finance to oversee the implementation of the Widow Allowance Programme. In addition, there is an Advisory Council under the leadership of the honorable minister of Social Welfare. The field level officials, local representatives implement the programme at the field level.

## **6.8 Committees at the Field Level**

### **Upazila Committee:**

Upazila Nirbahi Officer heads the Upazila Committee and Upazila social welfare officer is the member secretary of the committee.

- |  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| 1. Upazila Nirbahi Officer   | Convener         |
| 2. Union Parishad Chairman of the concerned Upazila  | Member           |
| 3. Renowned persons of the Upazila(one male and one female)<br>(Nominated by honorable MP) | Member           |
| 4. One representative of Upazila Chairman  | Member           |
| a. Upazila Social Welfare Officer  | Member secretary |

### **Work Area:**

1. To scrutinize the list of candidates recommended by Ward Committee.
2. Final approval of beneficiary list.

3. In addition to monitoring the allowance distribution programme, also settles down the appeal matter.

### **Union Ward Committee:**

The female members are the chairpersons and the UP members are the vice chairpersons of the committees.

- |   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| 1. Female member of the concerned ward from the reserve seat of the Union Parishad  | Convener         |
| 2. Elected UP member of the concerned ward (female/male)                            | Co-convener      |
| 3. Two local renowned persons (one male and one female) (Nominated by honorable MP) | Member           |
| 4. Representative of Upazila Chairman-one   | Member           |
| 5. Union Social Worker /Technical instructor  | Member Secretary |

### **Work Area:**

1. According to the policy guideline prepared for allowance distribution to the widowed and husband deserted women, after preliminary selection a list should be prepared by the ward committee.
2. For final approval, the prepared list should be placed before the Upazila Committee.
3. Primarily resolve the complain related to candidate selection. Any matter related to appeal should be send to the Upazila Committee for resolution.

### **6.9 Beneficiary Selection Procedure:**

1. For giving allowance to the widow and husband deserted distressed women, Ward Committee should invite application by informing local people through wide circulation.
2. The applicants, who are interested to be beneficiaries of the Widow Allowance programme, should apply to the Social Welfare Officer.
3. Two separate committees at the Ward and Upazila level will be responsible to select beneficiaries of the Widow Allowance Programme.

If any beneficiary dies, the committee will select the candidate from the waiting list of the same year.

### **6.10 Conclusion:**

With the intention to perform the Widow Allowance Programme more efficiently and in a more structured manner, the government of Bangladesh developed the implementation guideline which was expected to be followed by government officials and public representatives responsible for implementing the programme and to the end a number of important criteria for selection of beneficiaries were added up to this implementation guideline. Besides, a number of committees were formed at different levels with a view to ensure the proper implementation of the programme.



## CHAPTER SEVEN: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

### **7.1 Introduction:**

This chapter is mainly designed to present the data collected through different methods and analyzes them in line with the research question. The study was designed to find out the implementation effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme and the research question and objectives were also designed in that direction. In line with the research question, analytical framework was developed with relationship between dependent and independent variable. Independent variables were measured by developing certain questionnaires, which were asked to the respondents to get the answers of the research question. The findings came from the study are arranged and analyzed systemically below.

### **7.2 Patronage and Corruption:**

“Corruption is not a new phenomenon. It is rooted deeply in the socio-political, economic and administrative system of a country. Defining corruption is difficult since it varies from situation to situation, culture to culture and country to country”(Khan,1998). The statement informs the fact that Corruption is pervasive all over the world. Another article focuses on the adverse impact of corruption on state and poor people. “When corruption becomes pervasive access of the citizens to the basic public service deliveries become a function of capacity to make unauthorized payments. In other words, corruption affects the poor and disadvantaged more than others in the society” (Iftekhharuzzaman, 2009). So, the above literature shows that corruptions including patronage have very bad impact on state. Many public policies can not show the desired light due to the prevalence of corruption in public sectors.

In a developing country like Bangladesh, like many other countries in the world corruption is overwhelming in different areas as the article suggests “Corruption is all-pervasive in Bangladesh. Though corruption has been a part of our Politico-administrative heritage, there is little denying the fact that after independence the tentacles of corruption have engulfed the entire society” (Khan, 1998)

In poverty stricken country like Bangladesh due to wide disparities in income distribution and the needs of vast numbers of people who survive under conditions of extreme poverty, add special significance to the prevalence of corruption. Indirect implications of corruption on the poor include diverting Government resources away at the expense of social sectors. The

competition for scarce resources among many potential candidates create avenue for the opportunistic people to adopt illegal measures.

In rural area of Bangladesh many of the opportunistic people through political and other connections try to capture many of public resources. The local political leaders who have the hold on these public resources also try to satisfy their supporters through these benefits. Different government funds are some major sources of this patronage distribution by the local political leaders. This fact was particularly identified by Tiebout's model which predicted that "local politicians from different regions compete to offer better public programmes, it is likely that local elections generate incentives for politicians within the same sub national unit to distribute particularistic favors to increase their electoral popularity".

In another article it also came into limelight where the writer mentioned that-"Political parties and politicians distribute patronage for electoral gains. Many scholars have argued that political parties find it more efficacious to target the poor for patronage than the rich."

In another study the writer indicates "In developing and least developed countries there are strong correlation between political connections and receiving the benefit of Social Safety Net (Caeyers and Dercon, 2008). As the statement suggests, in a third world country like Bangladesh where resources are insufficient, one of the important sources of patronage distribution is different government funded projects and programmes at the rural level. As part of the government programmes, the Social Safety Net Programmes are thought to be major vehicles of this patronage distribution. The politicians bearing powerful positions in government in majority cases might want to distribute patronage to their supporters and also to their relatives through these safety net programmes. For these patronage distributions the political leaders at the local level might rely on the implementing officials to serve their interest.

Social safety net programmes are the essential measures provided by Government with the intentions and objectives to reduce poverty and vulnerability issues of the poor rural people of Bangladesh. But these goals and objectives may be distorted if there is practice of patronage distribution or corruption. Any types of involvement of political personnel or other persons in patronage distribution or corruption practices will certainly have impact on the selection of

beneficiaries. Whether the political patronages or corruption had any role in the implementation (selection of beneficiaries) of the Widow Allowance Programmes the following stages of the implementation guideline were verified whether they were properly followed. If there was any deviation this study was attempted to find out whether the factors like political patronage, corruption or other factors had played any role in it.


### 7.2.1 Selection Criteria

A questionnaire survey was administered among the beneficiaries to examine whether or not the beneficiaries were selected following the criteria mentioned in the implementation guideline of the Widow Allowance Programme provided by the government. In fact, to qualify as beneficiary of the allowance programme some criteria were specified in the government provided guideline. Widowhood or husband desertedness was the prime requirement to be qualified as a beneficiary. Among these the women who were relatively aged, distressed, almost landless and having 2 children under 16 years of age were supposed to be given priority in the selection process as suggested by the guideline. Therefore, to find out the extent to which these selection criteria were followed a few questions were asked to the beneficiaries to find out the level of compliance status of the guideline by the implementing officials.

#### 7.2.1.1 Ground of Selection of the Beneficiaries:

A total of 15 beneficiaries were interviewed in each Union. Among them almost 87% were widow and 13% were husband deserted. The chart-1 shows the following picture.

**Chart-1 Ground of Selection of the Beneficiaries**




Source: field survey

In the implementation guideline, it is mentioned that old aged, distressed and helpless widowed or husband deserted women should be given priority. During the fieldwork it was found out that, the number of husband-deserted women had been insignificant in the list of the beneficiaries. The reasons the officials showed behind this huge variation in the selection between two groups were that there was no specific number fixed for each of them in the guideline. They informed that the “economic condition” was generally given higher priority than any individual group. However, in practice it was the discretionary power of the government officials and public representatives who played the predominate role in the decision regarding selection of beneficiaries. The officials considered that the widow women were more vulnerable and it was difficult to verify husband deserted women. The government officials mentioned that getting information as to whether or not the husband really left a woman or deserted her is a daunting task and therefore in most cases they wanted to avoid this difficult process of verification and followed the principle of convenience whereby they choose the vulnerable widow women in majority cases.

### 7.2.1.2 Beneficiaries Having Children:

**Chart-2: Beneficiaries Having Children**




Source: field survey

The above table shows that in both the Unions the number of respondents was higher who had children. In Latifpur about 93% respondents had children whereas in case of Kharnia it was found to be 80%.

### 7.2.1.3 Who the Beneficiaries Live with?

In the context of Bangladesh, husband is the only bread winner for the most women .In the absence of this support, women actually become dependent on other people. Where some are supported by their children, some get support from their husband’s family, from parent’s family, from their relatives whereas some live alone. In the implementation guideline it has been mentioned that based on their living condition that is economic, social condition and family support patterns those who are more distressed, more helpless are the target groups of this allowance support. The chart-3 shows that most of the respondents in both the Unions under study lived with their children. For Latifpur the percentage was about 73% and for Kharnia it was about 53%.The percentage were very low for the respondents who lived with their parent’s family, husband’s family and with other relatives in comparison to those who lived alone(20%) .

**Chart-3 Who the Beneficiaries Live with?**




Source: field survey

**7.2.1.4 Beneficiaries and Number of Children:**

Those who had children were asked about the numbers of children they had and the response given is shown in the chart below-

**Chart 4: Beneficiaries and Number of Children**



Source: field survey

The chart shows that the percentage is higher for the respondents who had more than one children in both the cases. In Latifpur there was no respondent who had 1 children, most of them had more than 2 children. The beneficiaries having more than 3 to 4 children constituted 53% of the total respondents whereas the beneficiaries having more than 5 to 6 children constituted 20%. In case of Kharnia the percentage of respondents with more than 2 children was also higher. Respondents with 1 to 2, 3 to 4 and 5 to 6 children were found to be respectively 33%, 20% and 27%.

#### 7.2.1.5 Beneficiary-Mother with 2 Children under 16 years of Age:

Women with two children under 16 years had been given more priority in terms of getting the benefit. Women within this group are comparatively younger. It is very difficult for the young women to go outside to meet their family expenses. On this ground, probably this criteria was included to support these women.

**Table-1: Beneficiary-Mother with 2 Children under 16 years of Age (n=30)**

Union	Latifpur	Kharnia
Under 16 years 2 children	-	6.67

Source: field survey

However, from the respondents it was found that in Latifpur there was no respondent within this group but it was 6.67% in Kharnia. The data shows that this requirement was underestimated in

this case. Therefore, this criteria requirement was not followed properly as mentioned in the guideline.

### 7.2.1.6 Sources of Income of the Respondent

In the context of rural areas in Bangladesh husband is generally the only support for the women and where husband is absent support from children and other relatives become important. Sometimes they have the ability to take care of their own expenses. In some cases, the widowed or husband deserted women do not have support of any kind and in other cases are incapable to bear expenses by her. It turned at times unbearable for them to carry their livelihood. They are the main target group of the Widow Allowance Programme. From the primary data, almost close distribution had been found in Latifpur in terms of the respondents who had income source of their own (47%) and who had not (53%). In Kharnia this is equally (40%) distributed for both the groups. It was also found out that in Kharnia 20% were not directly having any individual income source but lived on begging and taking help from others and table-2 demonstrates this:

**Table-2: Sources of Income of the Respondents (n=30)**

In percentage

Option	Latifpur	Kharnia
Yes	46.67	40
No	53.33	40
Others	-	20

Source: field survey

### 7.2.1.7 Individual Income and Family Support:

In the implementation guideline of the Widow Allowance Programme it has been clearly mentioned that, the women who were distressed, helpless would have to be given priority. However, the data gathered from 2 Unions testified to the fact that there had been clear violation of the principles set forth in the guideline.

**Table-3: Individual Incomes and Family Support (n=30)**

In percentage

Option	Respondent Income	Family member's income support
Latifpur	33.33	66.67
Kharnia	53.33	46.67

Source: field survey


From the field level data it appeared that in Latifpur about 67% of the respondents had children who were looking after them and also providing all sorts of other support to them and about 33% of them were devoid of such support. In Kharnia, about 47% of the total respondents were found to have children looking after them and also providing all sorts of other support to them while about 53% of the respondents did not have such family support.

### **7.2.1.8 Beneficiary's Occupational Status:**

Those beneficiaries who bear their own expenses were involved in different types of occupation. In an attempt to find out the occupational distribution of the respondents in case of Kharnia, 50% of the respondents were found to be daily labour and 50% of them were field labour. Those respondents who did not have job (20%) were found to have been involved in begging and other means of living. In case of Latifpur 40% of the respondents were house-maid and the rest were involved in different occupations such as business, daily labour and cultivation (chart-5).



**Chart 5: Beneficiary's Occupational Status (n=30):**




Source: field survey

**7.2.1.9 Beneficiary's Family Member's Occupational Status:**

As to the responses of the previous question, many respondents mentioned that they had family support and the majority of supports were from their children. The respondents who were supported by their family members in bearing expenses were asked as to which types of occupation their family members were involved and their opinion is presented in the following manner.

**Chart-6: Beneficiary's Family Member's Occupational Status:**




Source: field survey

Data gathered from the study areas revealed that in Latifpur about 40% of the respondent's children were involved in job (working in garment, mill and shop), 20% of them were field labour, 30% of them were involved in pulling rickshaw/van and 10% of the respondent's family members were involved in business of their own. In Kharnia almost 86% of the respondent's children were field labour and rest of them were doing business.

**7.2.1.10. Beneficiary's Monthly Income Range:**

While assessing the monthly income range of the respondents during the fieldwork it was revealed that 80% of the respondents of Latifpur and 63% of Kharnia fell within the income bracket of 500- 3000, while 20% of the respondent's income in Latifpur was found to be within the range of 3001-5500 and for Kharnia this figure was almost 37%.

**Chart-7: Beneficiary's Monthly Income Range (n==30):**




Source: field survey

**7.2.1.11 Beneficiary's Family Member's Monthly Income Range:**

To find out how much the respondent's family member contribute to the family and it was found the income range between 3001-5500 taka was the dominant group. The individual distribution for the two Unions Kharnia and Latifpur showed these to be respectively 71.43% and 50%. The next dominant income range was found to be 5501-7000, where 30% of the respondent's family member in Latifpur and about 14% in Kharnia fell within this group and contributed to the family (chart-8).

**Chart-8: Beneficiary's Family Member's Monthly Income Range (n=30)**




Source: field survey

It is a generally held view that in the context of Bangladesh widowed /husband deserted women are helpless especially when they do not have any other support. It is interesting to note that in both the study areas many of the respondents were in receipt of support of different sorts from their children. It can be said that in the context of our country there are many women who are truly distressed and vulnerable and yet they remain outside the focus of the Safety Net Programmes. This view was shared by many of the non-beneficiaries who were interviewed during the field visit. Some of these non-beneficiaries indicated that due to the procedural loop holes and the internal local political dynamics women with real need or adverse conditions were often not included as beneficiaries under the programme. When we juxtapose the reality with the programme guideline, it appears that the criteria which were needed to be followed for selecting the right set of beneficiaries were not always followed by the concerned authority.

#### **7.2.1.12 Land Ownership Pattern of the Beneficiaries:**

Those who have land have some sources of income by effective utilization of the land and thus can contribute to their family expenses and probably for that reason in the guideline they are excluded from the potential beneficiary group. A clearer picture about land ownership from the primary data showed that in Latifpur about 27% respondents had lands and about 73% did not have. In case of Kharnia 60% of the respondent had land, 40% did not.

**Chart-9: Land Ownership Pattern of the Beneficiaries (n==30)**



Source: field survey

### 7.2.1.13 Amount of Land:

Probably those who have more lands are in a much better position from economic perspective in compare to those who have less and who do not have any. The survey data showed that the respondents did not have much amount of land. Distribution in two Unions showed that, in case of Kharnia among the respondents who had land, 40% of them had the amount in between 1-10 decimals and for Latifpur it was 13.33%.The percentage is minimal for the rest of the cases.

**Table- 4: Amount of Land (n==30):**

In percentage

Amount	Latifpur	Kharnia
1-10(decimal)	13.33	40
11-20	6.67	13.33
More than 20	6.67	6.67


Source: field survey

So, It is assumed that most of the respondents did not have much land which was to some extent qualified the criteria needed to be a beneficiary except in 2 cases in Latifpur and 3 cases in Kharnia where they had more than 11 decimals of land and in these cases the respondents also had family support.

#### 7.2.1.14. Age Distribution of Beneficiaries:

Among the widowed or husband deserted the old aged women has been given more priority in the implementation guideline. There are many women within this group in the rural areas where they do not have any familial support and their economic condition is also bad. These women due to their physical inability are very much vulnerable to any adverse condition. This group of women is given more emphasis in the allowance programme. However, the field data revealed that in case of Latifpur respondents above 60 years of age was only about 27% whereas this age group represented 33% for Kharnia. The total respondents below age 60 were about 73% in case of Latifpur, which was about 67% in case of Kharnia (chart-10).

**Chart-10: Age Distribution of Beneficiaries (n==30)**



Source: field survey

So, this suggests that this selection criterion has been given less importance in both the study areas because of which allowance is not reaching the target group to the extent it is expected.


### 7.3 Compliance of Guideline with regards to the Selection Process:

To confirm whether the selection process declared in the implementation guideline was followed accurately by the implementing officials they were asked certain questions in relation with this and if there was any deviation endeavor was there to identify the reasons behind the deviation.

#### 7.3.1. Gaining Information about the Programme:

In the guideline it is explicitly mentioned that the Ward Committee should invite application by circulating the information among the local people. However, during interviews, majority of the beneficiaries mentioned that they were informed about the programme not from the local circulation.

**Chart-11: Gaining Information about the Programme (n=30)**



In case of Latifpur and Kharnia beneficiaries were informed by other sources such as from villagers, from relatives, member of the Union Parishads. In case of Latifpur, about 47% were informed from other people in the village, the rest were informed from the relatives (26.67%) and Union Parishad members (26.67%), whereas majority of the respondents of Kharnia were informed by Union Parishad members (53.33%) and the remaining were informed from the villagers (26.67%) and from relatives (20%). While interviewing, many of the non-beneficiaries informed that they could never know when and how the selection took place. So, it can be said that proper circulation of information which was the responsibility of the Ward Committee was not done properly and it was a clear violation of the implementation guideline. The following case validates the response-


#### **Case study-1**

Rahima (60) who lost her husband 10 years ago is a poor woman residing in one of the villages in Kharnia Union. After the death of her husband she was living with her only daughter very lonely. She was suffering from acute diabetes. Due to her illness she could not do any hard work. Having no permanent income source, she had to rely on the mercy of others to maintain her livelihood. After she could gain information about the Widow Allowance Programme, she desired to be enrolled in the programme. But she seemed to be very much disappointed because of her inability to apply for the allowance due to lack of information. She could never know when the selection started and when it ended.

### 7.3.2. Applying for the Allowance

Allotment for allowance is settled from the Ministry or from Director General's office and it is disseminated at the field level. It is mentioned in the guideline that the field office must prepare a waiting list of the deserving candidates and when allotment reaches at the field level the beneficiaries must be selected from the waiting list. In addition, to prepare this list the Ward Committee must circulate publicly and invite application from the deserving candidates to select the beneficiaries of the Allowance Programme. During the field work, the beneficiaries were asked whether or not this process was followed.

**Chart-12: Applying for the Allowance (n=30)**



Source: field survey

It was found in the study area that in Latifpur 73.33% respondents did not make any application for the allowance and this figure represented 60% for Kharnia. Only 26.67% respondents in Kharnia and 13.33% in Latifpur informed that they made application. It was also found out that about 13% both in Latifpur and Kharnia did not have any idea whatsoever with regard to the application process. Therefore, it appeared that this procedure was not followed as suggested by the guideline.

Those who made the application did not make this application on their own which was indicated during the field visit. In both the cases the relatives, local members helped them filled in the application form.

This response was also confirmed when the officials were asked the question whether they followed up the guideline in case of selection.

### 7.3.3. Compliance of the Guideline with regards to Application and Circulation:

With regard to the selection procedure, it has been mentioned in the guideline that by wide circulation of information application should be invited from the potential beneficiaries. The officials who were directly involved with the implementation process were asked whether they followed the exact process of selection as mentioned in the guideline. The opinions offered by the officials just echoed the opinions of the beneficiaries.

**Table-5: Compliance of the Guideline with Regards to Application and Circulation (n=8):**

Option	Latifpur			Kharnia		
	Call for application	Circulation	Committee formation	Call for application	Circulation	Committee formation
Yes	-	-	-	-	-	-
No	100%	75%		100%	100%	
In some cases does not follow		25%	100%			100%

Source: field survey

While interviewing the officials in Latifpur union, 75% of them informed that there was no circulation with invitation for application whereas in Kharnia 100% officials informed that they did not invite application.

During the interview of the officials, they stated that in most of the cases, those who were selected were given application to fill in. The respondents could not fill in the application as they were not literate enough to join the programme and they needed someone to help them with it. In almost all cases the officials, the members, the respondent's relatives filled in the application in favor of them.

While the question was posed as to why the wide circulation or information for application was not made widely circulated, most of the officials and Union Parishad members and Chairman informed us that there were more applicants than earmarked allotment sent by the ministry for specific area. Had there been more circulation more applicants would have been interested and



this would have put immense political pressure on the local leaders because of which they wanted to avoid it. The officials who were interviewed also stated that the political leaders did not want other to put pressure on them because they were politically or otherwise biased. Therefore, they did not want to publicize widely. The officials and members/Chairman of the Union Parishad also thought that wide circulation for application would involve additional administrative cost and burden for them.

### **Committee Formation at the Local level:**

As per the guideline the Ward Committee was supposed to be comprised of five members including-

- a) The female member of the reserve seat <sup>2</sup>as the convener;
- b) The concerned UP member of the Ward as member;
- c) Two respected/renowned persons nominated by MP and one by Upazila chairman as members and
- d) The Union Social Worker as the member secretary.

It is mentioned in the guideline that in the committee the respected/renowned persons should be local institutional head/local religious institutional head/retired government officials/representative of the leading cooperatives registered by Directorate of Social Services. It was found from the interview that in the Ward Committee of Latifpur the convener and general secretary of a powerful political party of the Union were included in the committee from the respected/renowned person category. In case of Kharnia the picture was almost the same; the political nominee dominated the committee. It was a clear violation of the committee structure suggested by the government provided guideline. According to the guideline, the MPs and Upazila Chairman were not supposed to have any role in the whole process of selection of beneficiaries and conduct of the programme. Nevertheless, in both the areas under study, it was found that Upazila Chairman and even MP tried to interfere in the selection process in most cases, with the intention to include their people.

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<sup>2</sup> There shall be reserved three seats exclusively for women members in each Union Parishad, who shall be elected by direct election on the basis of adult franchise in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance and the rules. (The Local Government Union Parishads Ordinance,1983)

#### 7.3.4. Sources of Verification of the Widow, Divorce and Husband Desertedness.

The guideline suggested that the Ward Committee should verify whether the potential beneficiaries fulfill all the requirements needed to qualify as a beneficiary. The Ward Committee is the local level committee, which supposed to deal with the grassroots people. Probably on this ground, this responsibility was imposed on this committee. The government officials were asked a few questions as to how the verification was actually carried out at the field level, which had been bearing upon the implementation process of the allowance programme. The following answers were registered:

**Table-6: Sources of Verification of the Widow, Divorce and Husband Desertedness (n=8):**

Source of verification	Latifpur	Kharnia
	Percentage	Percentage
Certification by the Union Parishad Chairman	100	
The Ward Committee examine	-	100
By local Union Parishad members	-	
Verification from Social Welfare Office.	-	

Source: field survey

In Latifpur Union, all the respondents mentioned that on the basis of the certificate of the Union Parishad Chairman this was confirmed. However, in case of Kharnia Union the Ward Committee verified this.

During interview with the beneficiaries, a question was asked as to whether any member of the Ward Committee or anyone associated with the programme came for verification and all of them (100%) in both the Unions replied in the negative.

Although in the guideline, it is mentioned that by proper verification the Ward Committee should prepare the list of potential beneficiaries. But from the above responses of the beneficiaries it became obvious that the verification was not done properly which meant the government provided guideline was not followed properly.

### **7.3.5 Verification Made by any Member of the Ward Committee or Others.**

While asking the question to the members of the Ward Committee who verify the criteria requirements needed to be included as beneficiaries, they also held the same opinion as mentioned by the officials. But, the respondents of the Union Parishad argued in favor of this that they knew well about their Wards and therefore they did not need to verify. Given this, it can be argued that only those persons who were known to the members were included in the list, as they were not relying on an open selection process. Therefore, these created avenues for excluding of many deserving persons. This fact was also supported by the interviews that we had with the non-beneficiaries and officials and also by the participants of Focus Group Discussions (FGD).

In regard to verification about getting other types of government /non government benefits the officials were asked about the process they follow-

### **7.3.6 Verification of the People in Receipt of Multiple Benefits (view of officials)**

As per the requirements of the government provided implementation guideline for Widow Allowance Programme, the Ward Committee will prepare the list after verification of the beneficiaries about the selection criteria and as well as whether they were getting other types of government or non-government benefits. In Latifpur all the government officials mentioned that local Union Parishad members were responsible for verifying whether the beneficiaries were in receipt of other types of benefits or not. In Kharnia all the government officials mentioned that the Ward Committee examined this. On the other Hand, The Union Parishad members and Chairmen informed that they prepared the list of beneficiary after following a tedious process of verification. To crosscheck the responses given by the officials and the Ward Committee members the beneficiaries were asked similar questions and the answers were also found to be similar.

### **7.3.7 Beneficiaries in Receipt of Multiple Benefits.**

In the implementation guideline it has been clearly mentioned that if any of the potential beneficiaries are in receipt of the following government/non-government benefits such as-

- 1) Working in government or non-government institution.
- 2) Getting pension facilities as heredity.
- 3) VGD card holder as a distressed lady.

- 4) Getting any other regular government grant.
- 5) Getting regular financial grant from any non-government or social welfare institution.

Then they will not be qualified as beneficiary in this programme. So, when the beneficiaries were asked the questions whether they were in receipt of the following benefits they opined in the following manner:

**Table-7: Beneficiaries in Receipt of Multiple Benefits (n=30).**

Response	Latifpur	Kharnia
Yes		
No	100%	100%

Source: field survey

All the beneficiaries in both the Unions informed that they were not in receipt of any other benefits other than the widow allowance. The Union Parishad members in interviews stated that they actually did not give same person more than one benefit at a time. They added that there were lots of deserving candidates and therefore they strictly followed this rule.

However, when asking the non-beneficiaries many of them told that there were some beneficiaries who were getting more than one benefit. Few government officials mentioned that there were many Safety Net Programmes run by different departments. In most cases, there was no coordination among these departments. None of these government departments maintained the database on beneficiaries separately. Without the database, it was very difficult to identify people who were in receipt of more than one benefit at a given time. Generally, when they got benefits they tended to keep this in secret. Another official informed that-

“The Ward members and Union Parishad chairman generally have more information about the persons who get more than one benefit. But either on political or other ill intentions they tend to keep these secretes as well and therefore it is almost impossible to identify the persons getting multiple benefits from different sources.”

The same official added that they actually did not go for verification. They only moved for verification only when there was complain. Therefore, the local members were in a position to dominate the scene as far as verification was concerned. The government officials had to rely on

them for this matter. Therefore, there was wide scope for the local members to misuse power especially when they had ill intentions.

### 7. 3.8 Adherence to Guidelines Prescribed Stages of Selection

Selection process has to go through certain stages as suggested by the guideline where it is clearly mentioned that the Ward Committee after completion of verification will send the list of the beneficiaries to the Upazila Implementation Committee.

**Table-8: Adherence to Guidelines Prescribed Stages of Selection (n=8).**

Option	Latifpur	Kharnia
Yes	-	6.67%
No	-	-
Sometimes variation	100%	93.33%

Source: field survey

While question was posed to the officials as to whether they followed the exact stages in selection of beneficiaries as mentioned in the guideline, majority of the respondents of both the Unions were in agreement that sometimes there had been variations. They opined that there was no mention about the involvement of Union Parishad in the implementation guideline. However, in reality it was revealed that the list was also verified by the Union Parishad. Some officials during the time of interviews stated that the involvement of the Union Parishad Chairman was needed because he was the elected representative of the Union and he should have the power to check whether it was done in a proper way or not. Few officials mentioned that the Union Parishad Chairman sometimes put pressure on them to change the list at their will. The officials also opined that in between the Ward Committee and Upazila Committee any additional tier that was the Union Parishad <sup>3</sup>(which was not given any authority to involve in the selection process) caused delay in the process of selection. This also created room for the interference of the members of the Union Parishad in the process of beneficiary selection. The officials thought that

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
<sup>3</sup> Union shall be divided into nine wards. A Union Parishad shall consist of a Chairman and twelve members including three members exclusively reserved for women(The Local Government Union Parishads Ordinance,1983)

the members knew more about their local people. Therefore, sending the list to the Upazila implementation committee through this channel (Union Parishad) was not needed.

### 7. 3.9 Maintaining Waiting list

It is mentioned in the guideline that the concerned authority must prepare a waiting list of the distressed women so that during allotment they can distribute the allowance to the most deserved one from the priority list. The waiting list must be approved by the concerned authority.

**Chart-13: Maintaining Waiting list (n=8)**



Source: field survey

In the study areas, in case of Latifpur all the respondents mentioned that they did not have any waiting list while during interview the officials of Latifpur mentioned that in previous years they had waiting list. But now they could not follow this in many cases due to political pressure. Now they even could not prepare the waiting list. The reason they stated for not being able to do so was the political factors.

One of the respondents opined that, a properly prepared waiting list meant no manipulation was possible on political grounds. However, the political leaders wanted to incorporate the beneficiaries according to their preference. In most cases, if there was a waiting list they would not be able to include people of their choice. Because, preparing a priority list following an open selection process would require a proper circulation of information to all concerned specially to the potential beneficiaries. If this was ensured then the local leaders would not be able to include their “own preferred persons” and only the deserving candidates would have to be selected. The leaders were aware of the fact that this would then **adversely had impact** upon their intentions to create and sustain a vote bank and also other political motives. Therefore, the inclusion of beneficiaries in the list was done as secretly as possible. For avoiding these problems, they did not want to prepare waiting list.

In Kharnia, all the respondents stated that they had a waiting list of potential beneficiaries. They further informed that the selection of beneficiaries had become increasingly difficult given the current political polarization in the locality. For example, the local MP and the Upazila Chairman belonged to the same political party but the Union Parishad chairman and the majority of the Ward members belonged to the rival political party and they all tended to interfere to protect their own interests and tried to influence the selection process of the beneficiaries as much as they could. Due to conflicting interest, no one seemed to accept the list prepared by one party and therefore it was often the case that the chairman of UP or the UP members or the respected persons hesitated to sign the beneficiary list. They wanted the list to be prepared in their own way. One official mentioned that sometimes it took a long time (in some cases 2/3 months) to convince them. When they failed to reach to a consensus with regard the names to be included in the list they used to resort even to a mechanism like lottery and this could be seen as a clear violation of the government guideline. Sometimes when there was last date for submission of list, for the fear of lapse of money with request from the government officials or with the discussion within themselves they finally tried to reach a consensus on the matter.

### 7.3.10 Official’s Compliance Status of the Waiting list

The respondents of the Kharnia Union mentioned that they had waiting list and it was a good provision as they were complying with this requirement of the guideline.

**Table-9: Compliance Status of the Waiting list (n =4)**

Option	Kharnia
Yes	-
No	-
In most cases can follow	25%
Sometimes can not follow	75%

Source: field survey

However, while examining whether they followed the waiting lists all the times majority of the respondents (75%) in Kharnia mentioned that sometimes they could not follow the waiting list due to political pressure. One of the respondents opined that in the waiting list there was a

provision of keeping 10 persons for each Ward, but sometimes due to recommendation of the political leaders they had to make some adjustment to it. During the field visits, the researcher had the opportunity to check the waiting list and it appeared that though there was a decision to include 10 in the waiting list but in reality a couple of more people's name were found to be there which were included upon political considerations. This was the case in each Ward under the selected UPs.

Majority of the respondents mentioned that they had to maintain waiting list because there were opposing groups and competing interests in the committees. It is to be noted that quite often than not the name serials in the beneficiary list were broken because of the direct and indirect influence exerted by the local politicians.

### 7. 3.11 Information Update

It is an important issue to be addressed. It is natural or obvious that each year some beneficiaries would die, some would get marry again and family condition of some would change over time. There is provision in the guideline about the replacement of these beneficiaries with new one from the waiting list on a priority basis. The information about these changes must be placed before concerned authority to make this replacement. Therefore, this question was posed to the officials how they got information about these changes of circumstances of the beneficiaries.

**Table-10: Information Update (n=8)**

<b>Option</b>	<b>Latifpur</b>	<b>Kharnia</b>
Through the family members		
By the neighbors		
By the Union Parishad member	50%	75%
Social welfare Officer knows during the time of monitoring		
Sometimes through family members/neighbors and sometimes through members	50%	25%

Source: field survey



While answering the above question, majority of the respondents of both the Union Parishads we visited mentioned that Union Parishad members used to inform them .Some of the respondents (50% respondents in Latifpur and 25% in Kharnia) also mentioned that the family members and neighbors informed them. While being interviewed, a few officials stated that it was very difficult for them to know about the changes of the circumstances of the beneficiaries if they were not informed by the local leaders. The statement was also supported by the Union Parishad members.

### 7. 3.12 Inclusion of New Members

It is mentioned in the guideline that in case of change of circumstances of a beneficiary the allotment of that person will be cancelled and it is to be offered to the most deserving person from the approved waiting list. It was the decision of the Upazila Implementation Committee of both the Unions that the elimination of the name and replacement from the waiting list would be approved at the same time.

**Table-11: Inclusion of New Members (n=8)**

Option	Latifpur	Kharnia
	Percentage	Percentage
Word committee gives the replacement name		
From the waiting list		100%
From recommendation	100%	

Source: field survey

However, while asking what process the officials followed, in case of Latifpur the respondents mentioned that if any beneficiary died then they included a new name in the list based on the recommendation of the local influential leaders, as they did not have the provision of maintaining the waiting list. During our field visit, we had the opportunity to go through certain applications where it was found out that some Ward members applied to the concerned authority to drop down some name from the beneficiary list due to their change of circumstances. It was interesting to note that the local political leaders made recommendation on the application form to include certain names in place of those beneficiaries. The officials opined that some of the

replacements already took place on the basis of these types of recommendation and this was a clear violation of the government provided implementation guideline. The local political leaders could do this only because of the dominancy of a single political party from the Upazila to the Union level and no opposing groups were there to challenge them.

On the other hand, the situation was found to be different in Kharnia where all the officials mentioned that they had a waiting list and these criteria (replacement from waiting list) to some extent followed by the concerned authority. They showed two replacements which were taken from waiting list. The officials in interviews opined that the removal of the name of any beneficiary and replacement of that needed the approval of all the members of the Upazila implementation committee. They added that the Upazila Implementation committee as like the Ward Committee consisted of members from different political groups. So, because of conflicting interests, if they all times oppose each other in any decision regarding replacement it would be very difficult to perform any work related to this (replacement). To avoid these types of complex situations they used to maintain waiting list on a consensus basis and the replacement was done from the waiting list

### **7. 3.13 Effectiveness of the Ward Committee in Selection Process.**

The Ward Committee is one of the most important committee as far as selection is concerned. The Ward Committee is supposed to have the full responsibility to prepare the beneficiary list primarily as per the instruction of the implementation guideline. Upazila Implementation Committee then approves the list, which the Ward committee sends. The Ward Committee is the elected committee at the grass root level where the Ward member can play an important role in the enrolment of the most distressed people of the community to the contributory and non-contributory programmes. While examining the effectiveness of these committees in both the study areas majority of the officials informed that, the committee was not as effective as expected (table-12).

**Table-12: Effectiveness of the Ward Committee in Selection Process (n=8)**

In percentage

<b>Option</b>	<b>Latifpur</b>	<b>Kharnia</b>
Very much effective	-	
Effective	-	25
To some extent effective	-	
It is effective but sometimes it becomes ineffective(a)	25	75
Less effective (b)	75	
Not at all effective(c)		

Source: field survey

The reasons the officials of Latifpur put forward was that the present selection system was highly dominated by political considerations. The political leaders at the Upazila level wanted to prepare the list in their own way. During the time of selection of beneficiaries, they put immense pressure on the ward members to include their associates and supporters in the beneficiary list. Sometimes they did not even consider the lists the Ward Committee sent. One of the respondents who got elected twice as UP member mentioned that “the list we send is never considered by the Upazila level political leaders”. Some officials and Ward members also informed that in Ward Committee, all the members should have opinion and on a consensus basis, any decision should be taken. But, this committee was dominated by the political nominee where as members of Ward Committee the local Ward member and government officials had very little role to play. Their opinions were always underestimated by the political leaders. As a result, the ward committee became less effective.

The officials of Kharnia opined that the situation was somewhat different there. In the earlier years the elected Union Parishad Chairman was absent and the members and government officials were appointed as acting chairman of the Union Parishad. Therefore, they in most cases tried to dominate and included the persons in their own way. When the government officials were in charge, the problem was that due to their transferable job they were not capable of obtaining enough information about the Union. As a result, they had to rely a lot on the UP members and the members used to take advantage of this and selected beneficiaries in their own way.

They further stated that now the situation was different from the previous times. After the Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad election the entrance of the newly elected Union Parishad Chairman and Upazila Chairman who were from different political arena, reduced the powers of the local members. However, new dimensions of crisis became apparent. During the time of selection of beneficiaries, frequent conflicts of the local political leaders in the Ward Committee who had different political interests created such situation that sometimes the Ward Committee could not take any decision regarding selection and also other issues related to the Allowance Programme. The Ward committee then used to become less effective. Few other members of the Union Parishad were also in agreement with this view.


So, it has been found from the selection process that many of the processes mentioned in the guideline were not followed properly. The political influence of the local leaders to include their preferred people and involvement of the concerned personnel in corrupt practices were found to be the predominant factors behind this non compliance which led to in most cases improper selection of beneficiaries.

#### **7.4 Strength of Policy Design:**

##### **7.4.1 Proper Design of Policy:**

If the policy is not designed in a proper manner, certainly it will have impact on the selection process. There are a number of specific criteria mentioned in the guideline to select the beneficiaries. It is needed that the selection criteria are clearly defined or explained in the guideline. If the criteria are not specifically defined, it generally creates confusion and room for wide discretion and manipulation by the concerned authority. Those who have ill motive can then take advantage of it. Different people may also define it differently. All these irregularities may adversely impact upon selection of beneficiaries. The officials were asked the question whether this guideline was clearly defined as far as selection criteria was concerned. Following responses were received from them:

**Chart-14: Proper Design of Policy (n=8)**



Source: field survey

About 75% respondents in Kharnia and 50% in Latifpur informed that it was not clearly defined. They also stated that according to the guideline, distressed, helpless, almost landless persons were to be given priority. However, it was not clearly explained who would be called landless, how much one would have to have land in order to be identified as landless, how much income one would have to have to be treated as helpless or distressed were not mentioned properly in the guideline. In the guideline, there were clauses, which were contradictory. On the one hand, the guideline suggested that as far as selection was concerned the old people should be given priority; on the other hand, the guideline suggested that women with two children under 16 years of age should be given priority. In reality, if the second condition was followed than much younger women were to be included in the programme who might not be as vulnerable as truly old aged women. Therefore, there was a possibility that different people would interpret it differently. During interviews with the Union Parishad members, it was also confirmed. Some of them told us that they gave priority to old aged women while others told that comparatively younger women who had problems to go outside and who had younger children to look after were given priority. Whereas 50% respondents in Latifpur and 25% in Kharnia mentioned that criteria for selection were clearly defined in the guideline as they had their own interpretation of the terms and for them it was not difficult to choose the deserved women from many applicants. Therefore, it can be argued that there are many personnel involved in the selection process and therefore differential interpretation is likely which usually lead to manipulation and use of the criteria for selection to the advantage of those who matter.

## **7.5 Monitoring and Supervision**

### **7.5.1 Number of Visit or Inspection by the Higher Officials**

Monitoring and Supervision from the higher officials are very important for smooth and efficient running of the programme. Regular supervision and in depth monitoring from the higher officials keep the implementing officials alert and up-to-date with the present requirements. There is also less possibility of involving in corrupt practices in terms of selection of beneficiaries by the officials in the field level. To see whether monitoring and supervision were done as per the guideline certain questions were posed on the implementing officials and they gave the following responses-

**Table-13: Number of Visit or Inspection by the Higher Officials (n=8)**

	Respo ndents	Simple Visit(in a year)				Inspection(in a year)			
		Office rs From ministr y	Office rs from DG office	Distr ict level offic er	Others (DC/ UNO)	Office r's From ministr y	Officers from DG office	District level officer	Others (DC/ UNO)
Mitha pukur	100%	-	once	-	DC- 2 times UNO- sometimes			4 times	
Dumu ria	100%				DC-2 times UNO- sometimes	-	Once	2 times	

Source: field survey

When asked to the officials about the inspection/visit done by the higher officials, all the respondents mentioned that the inspection/visit by the ministry officials was absent. Respondents in Mithapukur Upazila mentioned that officials from DG office visited once a year, where it was absent in Dumuria. The respondents in both the Upazilas mentioned that only the immediate

higher official, the Deputy Director, Social Welfare Office used to inspect their offices. In case of Mithapukur it was 4 times and in case of Dumuria it was 2 times in a year. The view was validated through the inspection register and inspection report. The two deputy directors of Social Welfare Office from Rangpur and Khulna district informed that since they had to cover a lot of Upazilas under their jurisdiction and they had so other businesses to perform that it became difficult to visit all the Upazilas at time. All the respondents of both the Upazilas mentioned that while the higher officials came to visit or inspect, they did never pay attention to the aspects relating to the distribution of the allowance, they basically performed routine inspection; discussion on this allowance distribution matter was very less.

While asking the question whether there was any feedback after inspection done by the higher officials, respondents (100%) in both the Upazilas mentioned that they got feedback sometimes after inspection. The officials of both the Upazilas also informed that in most cases the higher officials gave both oral and written directions after inspection. When the question was posed as to whether the higher officials followed up the directions, the response was that-

**Table-14: Direction Given after Inspection (n=8)**

<b>Option</b>	<b>Mithapukur</b>	<b>Dumuria</b>
Always		20%
Sometimes	25%	-
In most cases	75%	80%

Source: field survey

A significant 75% of the respondents in Mithapukur mentioned that in most cases when the matter was more important they followed up this. In case of Dumuria this percentage was 80%. While the question how they took steps after their direction was posed, all the respondents (100%) mentioned that they took immediate steps after the direction of their higher officials.

## **7.6 Co-ordination**

### **7.6. 1 Frequency of Meeting of the Committees**

It is understandable that co-ordination is the most important aspect of any Programme. Proper co-ordination contributes to the achievement of the Programme target. Different stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the Widow Allowance Programme from the top to bottom level. As per the instruction of the guideline, Upazila and Union Committees were formed at the field levels which were supposed to be responsible for smooth operation of the programme. Certain responsibilities were imposed on both the committees and as per the instructions of the guideline, members of these committees were supposed to meet three to four times in a year to monitor and evaluate how the programme was performing and to deal with different sorts of problems they were facing.

**Table-15: Frequency of Meeting of the Committees (n=8)**

In percentage

	Respondents	No of meetings performed in the year,2011	
		Upazila committee	Ward committee
Mithapukur	100%	When allotment comes and during allotment distribution decision	When allotment comes and when there is any problem
Dumuria	100%	When allotment comes during distribution	When allotment comes and when there is any problem

Source: field survey

While asking the question as to the frequency of meetings of the committees, in reply the officials informed that the Upazila allotment committee conducted meeting on this matter when the allotment was sent to the Upazila. There was also an Upazila implementation committee where sometimes the matter was discussed when needed.

The officials in Mithapukur mentioned that in a year they had to attend meeting at the Upazila level when allotment came and when distribution was needed. In the district level, 2 to 3 times they had to attend meeting. In Dumuria, at Upazila level when allotment came the meeting was conducted. In the district level, 2 to 3 times they had to attend meeting.



The officials of both the Upazilas mentioned that generally they communicate with each other through telephone calls. The respondents (100%) of both the Unions also opined that in time of difficulties when they inform the higher authorities in most cases they got immediate response.

### 7.6 .2 Dealing with the Difficult Circumstances:

Beneficiary selection process is actually a team work where in the committee many stakeholders are involved, such as the government officials, Union Parishad Chairman, members, elite persons. Sometimes in processes like selection, communication with the beneficiaries, money distribution, there arise several problems. These are common problems faced by the officials in this allowance programme.

**Table-16: Dealing with the Difficult Circumstances (n=8)**

Option	Mithapukur	Dumuria
Take immediate help from immediate higher authorities	0	0
Take help from dg office/ministry	0	0
Solve the problem locally	80%	100%
Sometimes solve locally sometimes take help of higher authorities	20%	

Source: field survey

From the opinion of the officials, all the respondents in Dumuria Upazila mentioned that when they faced any problem they solved it locally .This was also practiced almost in a same manner in Latifpur. Only 20% respondents in Mithapukur mentioned that sometimes they solved the problem locally, sometimes took help of immediate higher authorities. The officials in Mithapukur opined that they commonly faced problem with selection. Sometimes there were clashes of interests, sometimes contradictions between local political leaders and government officials created situation where it became very difficult to reach to a consensus. One respondent mentioned that the higher authority could do nothing in this case. They solved the problem through mutual negotiation. In case of Kharnia, the respondents mentioned that they also had the main problem with selection. Due to the contradiction between different members from different

political parties sometimes it became very difficult to resolve many matters related to allowance programme. They in most cases used to resolve all these problems locally without the involvement of higher authorities.

So, from the discussion in terms of coordination it appeared that coordination between different authorities at the local level seemed to be harmonious and working well. When the officials faced any problem with regards to the selection of beneficiaries, they solved the problems at the Upazila level on their own. They actually did not want to involve the higher authorities. It can be said that resolving problems locally is a good practice. However, if the higher authority is not communicated at all by the local officials about what is going on in the field in terms of selection of beneficiaries, then they remain largely unaware of the ground realities and therefore the higher authorities can not take any effective measure to make the selection process better and more effective.

From the discussion it also appeared that monitoring and supervision on the parts of the higher officials were less than ideal. Due to insufficient monitoring and supervision, the field level officials could not make accountable to the higher officials. The field level officials could find wide scope to manipulate the process because the higher officials were not going to charge them for what they were doing. Lots of manipulation and irregularities were taking place in selection due to lack of monitoring and supervision.

### **7.6.3 Training:**

The officials and UP members who are directly involved with the selection of beneficiaries were asked whether they were given any training about the selection process, they responded in negative. They also opined that, they were not educated enough by the higher authorities about the policy guideline. Officials in interview stated, due to ignorance of the policy guideline the involved personnel were used to take many decision not suited with guideline. Lack of training about the selection process also created room for adopting wrong path in selection. All these led to improper selection of beneficiaries in many cases.

### 7.7 Inclusion of Beneficiaries in the Allowance Programme (View of Beneficiaries)

The main target of the Social Safety Net Programme is fulfilled when the deserved candidates get the benefit. However, reaching this target is not possible without a proper and transparent process. The goal of the programme will not be achieved, if the inclusion process is politically biased or devoid of sticking to the rules or when the process is manipulated by different stakeholders. The beneficiaries were asked how they were included in the allowance programme. Their opinion is presented in the following table:

**Table-17: Inclusion of beneficiaries in the Allowance Programme (n=30)**

In percentage

<b>Option</b>	<b>Latifpur</b>	<b>Kharnia</b>
Through Union Parishad Chairman(a)	53.33	26.67
Member (b)	13.33	60
Government officials©	13.33	-
Open selection	6.67	20
Others	-	-

Source: field survey

It was found from the study that majority of the beneficiaries in Latifpur Union could join the programme based on the recommendations of the local UP chairman, Ward members and government officials. The beneficiaries were asked whether they had any relation with them. The beneficiaries informed that, some of them could join the programme as they had relatives and friends who were politically or otherwise connected with the Union Parishad Chairman, UP members and government officials. In Kharnia Union we had the similar findings although only a few respondents of both the Unions were included through open selection process.

While interviewing, the officials of both the Unions also mentioned that the MP, Upazila Chairman, Union Parishad Chairman, UP members and sometimes government officials played the main role in the selection of beneficiaries.

To see how far the selection criteria outlined in the guideline were followed by the implementing officials, the following question was asked -

### 7. 7.1. Compliance of Guideline in terms of Selection Criteria of Beneficiaries.

There are certain criteria specified in the guideline for proper selection of beneficiaries which was supposed to be followed by the implementing officials and public representatives. The question was posed to the officials of both the Unions as to whether the criteria of selection of beneficiaries were followed as per the guideline and the response came from the respondents were as follows-

**Table-18: Compliance of Guideline in terms of Selection Criteria (n=8)**

In percentage

Option	Latifpur	Kharnia
Yes	-	50
No	-	-
Sometimes Does not	100	50

Source: field survey

The table shows that in Latifpur all the respondents mentioned that sometimes they could not follow the guideline. They pointed out the following reasons for not being able to stick to the guideline- Patronage and corruption, Shortcomings in policy content and design, problems in organizational practices. In case of Kharnia, 50% of the respondents mentioned that they always followed the guideline, while the rest of the respondents (50%) opined that sometimes they did not follow the guideline. They also mentioned almost about the same reasons contributing to the deviation from the guideline. The respondents in interviews mentioned that this non-compliance of the guideline in most cases resulted in improper selection of beneficiaries.

They prioritized the reasons behind non-compliance of the guideline or improper selection of beneficiaries in the following way-

**Table-19: Prioritization of the Reasons behind Improper Selection of Beneficiaries (n=8):**

In percentage

Reasons behind improper selection of beneficiaries	Latifpur	Kharnia
Patronage and corruption	100	100
Shortcomings in policy design	75	75
Problems in organizational practices	75	75

Source: field survey

In both the Unions under study local political leader's willingness to distribute patronage were found to be the major factors contributing to the improper selection of beneficiaries. In both the unions shortcomings in policy design were given the second most importance and problems in organizational practices were identified to be the next important factor.

In both the Unions all the respondents mentioned patronage and corruption as the most important problem. The officials particularly put more emphasis on political patronage and political corruption. They mentioned that political considerations were major barriers in the selection of the beneficiaries properly. One of the officials while being interviewed mentioned that sometimes the applicants were lined in an open field and then the list was prepared of the potential beneficiaries. However, in most cases the list prepared was not followed upon political consideration. The political leaders wanted to include those people who were politically important to them in one way or the other. Another respondent mentioned that they could not at all follow the proper selection criteria because of the political influence exerted by the MPs and Upazila chairman. They blamed nepotism to be a serious problem. While interviewing, a person informed that the persons who were involved in the selection process selected the people whom they knew well or whom they got along well with. Those who were involved in the selection process wanted to include their relatives as this was mentioned by one of the respondents in an interview. The same respondent informed that the political leaders, chairman, local members in most cases and government officials in some cases used to include their relatives. One of the respondents during interview told that when there were lots of applicants, political leaders, chairman, local members, government officials overlooked some of the essential criteria to be qualified as a beneficiary to include their own men.

Some of the officials of both the Unions while being interviewed mentioned that the Ward members locally wanted to include some people to reward his voters. In Kharnia this factor was found to be more important to the respondents. The field level government officials in Kharnia opined that in the absence of an elected chairman the members tended to dictate the terms of selection process in the previous years. Use of “bribe” was also a major factor responsible for improper selection. One of the respondents in Latifpur mentioned that in almost 80% cases members demanded money from the potential beneficiaries. One of the members of the previous Ward Committee of Latifpur informed that he was forced to collect money from the potential beneficiaries by the other Ward members which he did not like and later he resigned from the position. One official in Latifpur Union stated that-

“Sometimes the members demand money from the beneficiaries at the time of distribution of card after their inclusion in the programme. The beneficiaries in some cases are also willing to give money because they consider that by making such financial offerings they will be able to be a part of the safety net for the entire life. The persons who are included in the programme based on other subjective criteria remain loyal to the local politicians favouring them and become a permanent vote bank for them.”

Two respondents also mentioned that there were lot of complains came to them about this monetary transaction but due to lack of adequate evidence they could not take proper action. The person who had been included as a beneficiary by giving money did not want to express this secrete because of fear of loosing the benefit. While interviewing, two respondents stated about the shortcomings in the policy design (implementation guideline), such as, unclear selection criteria and contradictory clauses to be the predominant factors behind improper selection of beneficiaries in some cases. While interviewing, an official who was holding an important position at the field level stated that-

“It is a matter of great concern that in the implementation guideline there is no provision of taking any action against the persons who are involved in such illegal activities like taking bribe money from poor women in the rural areas. Those who have ill motives take advantage of the gaps and misuse their power”.

Some of the officials also stated that due to lack of coordination between concerned stakeholders sometimes problem arises in the selection process.

From the above discussions it can be assumed that–tendency for patronage distribution and corruption in most cases by the local level political leaders was the major factor contributing to the improper selection of beneficiaries. The next important factors were shortcomings in policy design and problems in organizational practices.

But, while the question as to whether the selection of beneficiaries was proper or not was posed to the beneficiaries, majorities (93.33%) of them were stating in the positive. This might be due to the fact that they were getting the benefits. . However, the facts, which were identified by the officials behind improper selection of beneficiaries, were later on confirmed by the interviews of the non-beneficiaries and from participants of FGDs.

The following case study support these statements-

### **Case study-1**

Amena Begum (60) is a beneficiary in one of the villages in Latifpur Union. She lost her husband 12 years ago. She had 2 sons. But they did not look after her. When employment was available, she worked as day labour in the nearby agricultural farm. During the lean season, she led her life on begging. It became very hard for her to maintain her expenses. She had been trying for 8 years to get the allowance. She met the local Union Parishad members several times but they did not come forward to help her out. The reason was that the concerned member demanded bribe amount to taka 2000 from her. She did not have that much money. She only had a goat, which she was forced to sell in order to be able to pay the bribe demanded by the member. Even after paying 2000 taka as bribe to the member her name was not immediately included in the list. The member started demanding more money, which she was not in a position to arrange. Amena Begum then resorted to one of her relatives who was a close associate of the chairman and who was also politically connected to the ruling party. Amena Begum's relative negotiated the matter with the member and finally her name was included in the list.

So, it is very difficult for the poor distressed women to be enlisted as beneficiary. Having political connection or offering bribe have become the prime requirements to be included as beneficiary.

### **7.8 Comparative Picture of two Unions under Study:**

We have chosen Latifpur Union of Mithapukur Upazila which is a poverty stricken area and Kharnia Union of Dumuria Upazila which has a relatively better economic profile. We have chosen these two areas with the intention to see whether the economic conditions have any impact on the implementation process in terms of selection of beneficiaries. Interestingly economic conditions seemed to have some impact in selection process. From the Information gathered through FGDs and interviews it appeared that economic condition has impacted demand side actors which somewhat influenced the selection process. The respondents of both the Unions mentioned that the deserving candidates were more in Latifpur Union under Mithapukur Upazila, which was a poverty stricken area, in compare to Kharnia Union under Dumuria Upazila. Additionally, it was found from the interviews in Latifpur Union that there were lot of pressure from the potential beneficiaries on the officials and public representatives to include their name in the list. In the Focus Group discussions and interviews the respondents also mentioned that the candidates tried to apply whatever means they could to be enlisted as a beneficiary under the programme. The immense competition led most of them to rely on the illegal means and as a result this created the opportunities for the concerned authority to manipulate the process in their favour. These views were supported by the officials while being interviewed and also by the public representatives. This sort of competition also existed in Kharnia Union but its prevalence was comparatively lower than Latifpur union.



## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **8.1 Introduction:**

This chapter looks into the findings discussed in the previous chapter through the lenses of analytical framework used in the study. The analytical framework is developed by establishing relationship between independent and dependent variables. In fact, the measurement of the independent variables by certain indicators helped to develop the relationship between dependent and independent variables. The dependent variable here is the effectiveness of the Widow Allowance Programme which is operationally defined as the consistent act of the implementing officials along with the implementation guidelines with regards to the selection of beneficiaries. To examine the relationship the independent variables were measured through certain indicators by developing a set of questionnaires along the line of the research question and objectives of the study. This chapter describes in a nutshell what the analysis of data has revealed in the previous chapters of the study.

#### **8.2 Summary of the Findings**

The study has attempted to evaluate how effective and efficient had been the beneficiary selection procedure. The intention was to see whether patronage and corruption, which was one of the variables, had any role to play in the effectiveness of the programme in terms of selection of beneficiaries. According to the guideline, there were certain procedures for the selection of beneficiaries which the implementers were supposed to follow, such as “inviting application for allowance through proper circulars and communication”, “application in the appropriate form”, “committee formation for selection” etc. As a matter of fact, such indicators were developed and questions were designed with a view to see how the actual procedure worked in reality. On this front, it has been found out that most of the processes specified in the implementation guideline for selecting the beneficiaries were not followed properly in both the Unions. The criteria set forth in the implementation guideline suggest that in order to be able to be included as beneficiary priority should be given to “the more aged”, to “the women with under 16 years 2 children”, to “the most helpless and distressed” (not in receipt of adequate support from the family members or others) were not maintained properly.

There were lots of anomalies found in the selection process. The frequent deviations from the implementation guideline were clearly found out in both the Unions under the purview of the study. The allowance implementation guideline suggested the preparation of a waiting list of the deserved candidates on a priority basis by making proper circulation of information to the potential beneficiaries. But in practice, this guideline was not followed by the concerned authority of both the Unions. Rather, it was revealed that the local political leaders secretly incorporated names of the people of their choice on their own and sometimes most deserving names were not included in the waiting list. The local government officials were found to be fully aware of this. The government officials informed us that the local leaders added names in the waiting list secretly as the funds were limited compared to the number of beneficiary interested to be included in the programme. It would not be possible on the part of the local leaders to include names of all the individuals who would be interested to join the programme. Making the process open would have meant that many interested potential beneficiaries, out of which only a few names could have been included and the significant rest would have been made dissatisfied. This is why the local leaders found this process having a serious political cost and backlash. Making the process open would also disrupt their desire to distribute the benefit to their preferred men. But the study has revealed that due to the absence of proper circulation many eligible persons remained absolutely unaware and out of the Allowance Programme.

It was revealed that the committee structure which was supposed to be a neutral body was in effect totally dominated by the local political leaders and the political influence exerted by the political leaders seemed to have negatively impacted on the selection process which ultimately creating a situation where deserving candidates were not included in the list.

In case of verification of the beneficiaries whether they actually meet the criteria set forth in the guideline or whether they were in receipt of other government or non-government benefits, it was revealed that the local members seemed to have exercised the most power and clout in this regard. Due to the absence of a database, lack of coordination between different departments involved with SSNPs and the absence of verification by the government officials, there were wide scopes of inclusion of candidates who were in receipt of more than one benefit. It opened up room for adopting illegal measures by those who had ill intentions.

The implementation guideline suggests that the selection process should only include the Ward Committee and the Upazila Implementation Committee. As a matter of fact in the ideal scenario the Ward Committee was expected to prepare the list of beneficiaries and send it to the Upazila Implementation Committee for its routine approval. In the process of selection of beneficiaries the MP and Upazila Chairman are not supposed to be dictating the terms of selection of beneficiaries. However, in reality it was found out that MP and Upazila Chairman seemed to have played most dominant role in the selection process. During our field visit, it was also revealed that Union Parishad in general and Chairman in particular also tended to influence the process of selection of beneficiaries, although no such involvement of UP was envisaged in the implementation guideline.

Overall, there was lot of anomalies in the selection process and lot of deviation found from the standard procedure mentioned in the implementation guideline which led to improper selection of beneficiaries in many cases. The most important factor contributed to this improper selection of beneficiaries was patronage and corruption.

The other factor responsible was problems in organizational practices. As parts of organizational practices, monitoring and supervision by higher officials are very important factors for smooth and efficient running of the programme. However, these found to be very weak in both the Unions. The higher authorities performed these only as their routine work. Visits and inspections by the higher authorities in both the Unions were less than ideal when compared with the provisions of the guideline. Verification and in-depth inspection at the field level was almost absent. Absence of proper monitoring and inspection created room for irregularities in the selection of beneficiaries.

Coordination, which is one of the important components of organizational practices, is another very important issue for better selection of beneficiaries. On the coordination front, it appears that coordination between different authorities at the local level seemed to be harmonious and working well. They solved most of the problems on their own, mostly at the Upazila level. They actually did not want to involve the higher authorities unless compelled. Attempting to resolve problem locally is certainly a good practice. However, if the higher authority is not communicated at all by the local officials then they remain largely unaware of the ground realities and therefore the higher

authorities can not take any effective measure to make the selection process work better and more effective.

Monitoring and Supervision seemed to be less than ideal from the higher authorities. The field level officials had wide scope to manipulate the process, because the higher officials were not going to charge them for what they were doing. Lots of manipulation and irregularities were taking place in selection due to lack of monitoring and supervision.

Problem in Policy design was also found. From the study, some weaknesses were found in the implementation guideline which also had negative impact in the selection process. There were some criteria for the beneficiaries to be qualified as “beneficiary”, but many of these criteria were not specifically defined in the guidelines, which created room for misunderstanding, and concerned authority could apply wider discretionary power in this regard. Differential interpretation was likely to be there which usually led to manipulation and use of the subjective criteria for selection often used to the advantage of those who had ill intentions. Another weakness was also apparent. In the guideline, there was no provision to give punishment to those who were involved in any illegal activities. These gaps in the guideline could create room for the ill motive people to be benefited by adopting illegal measures in the selection of beneficiaries.

All these irregularities (patronage and corruption, problems in organizational practices, shortcomings in policy design) made the whole selection process improper. The most deserving women were at times left out of the safety net either because of the political considerations were either given prominence or because of the local leader’s ill-intentions to earn extra-legal income by manipulating the process of selection.

Besides, there had been other important aspects which were also found out during the course of the study. The field level officers and local members were never offered any training by the government to make them familiar with the provision of the guideline. Many of them did not have clear idea whatsoever about different sections and provisions of the guideline. As a result, they

applied their own judgment in many cases due to lack of knowledge. Strikingly, it was also revealed that field level government officials had a very less important role to play in the selection process.

Therefore, from the above findings and analysis it can be mentioned that among the variables, the presence of independent variables such as- patronage distribution and corruption, less adherence of the officials to organizational practices, shortcomings in Policy Design hinders the implementing officials from adherence to the policy that is the implementation policy guideline. Due to these factors the beneficiaries were not properly selected. From that point of view, irregularity in the selection process in many cases has reduced the overall effectiveness of the programme. The target of government is to reach one of the most vulnerable groups that are the widowed and husband deserted distressed women through this programme, if the target group is not properly selected then obviously the main goal of the government will not be achieved. So, overall the implementing officials could not comply fully with the guidelines and this ultimately made the programme less effective.

### **8.3 Linking the Issue with the Theory:**

The study mainly designed with the concept goes with the main spirit of Top-Down approach, where it has been stated that top-down approach started with a policy decision (the implementation guideline) and the present study focused on the issues like-

- (1) The extent to which implementing officials act consistently with the Objectives and procedures outlined in the policy decision;
- (2) To assess the roles played by different factors & actors and their interaction and interplay in the implementation process.

The present study is an attempt to assess the Widow Allowance Programme from the supply side perspectives. The implementation of this programme carries on the base of the implementation guideline of Widow Allowance Programme which is a policy decision from the government to help the helpless, distressed widowed and husband deserted women. To reach the target group certain objectives were settled and certain procedures were developed to reach the objectives. So, the aim of this study was to see the extent to which implementing officials act consistently with the Objectives and procedures outlined in the policy decision. Here the dependent variable is the

effectiveness of the programme and the independent variables are- patronage distribution and corruption, nature of organizational practices, strength of policy design. The objective was to see whether the factors mentioned as independent variables could play any role in the effectiveness of the programme by influencing the implementing officials.

Therefore, in the study, independent variables such as- patronage distribution and corruption, nature of organizational practices, strength of policy Design were measured against certain indicators to see the effectiveness of the programme. It was found out that less adherence of the implementing officials to organizational practices, shortcomings in policy design and more importantly the tendency to distribute patronage and corruption by the local political leaders played the predominant role behind deviations in many cases from the standard procedures suggested in the implementation guideline. The implementing officials could not act consistently with the implementation guideline in most cases for different reasons already explained elsewhere in the thesis. We argue that these deviations have made the Widow Allowance Programme less effective.

#### **8.4 Recommendations:**

To protect the most vulnerable section of people in the country from falling below certain poverty level the Social Safety Net Programmes are undertaken by the government. The main aim of these programmes is to reach the target group in an effective and efficient manner so that correct beneficiaries are selected in the programme. But the effectiveness of the programme depends on how well and efficiently the programme is being implemented in terms of selection of beneficiaries. It is to be noted that during the course of data collection certain loop-holes were found in the selection of beneficiaries of the allowance programme. It can be argued that the government must pay special attention to these problems and take immediate measures to address them so as to make the allowance programme effective.

During the field visits, we have had the opportunity to meet the ministry level bureaucrats, beneficiaries of the programme, local political leaders, local level bureaucrats and also the non-beneficiaries. We have asked a question as to how this allowance programme could be made more effective. The respondents came up with their own perspectives on the point in question. Based on their ideas following recommendations can be made with a view to improve the Widow Allowance Programme:

**Selection in Open Field:** To ensure transparency and accountability the selection of beneficiaries must be done in an open field. The potential beneficiaries must know whether the selection is done in a proper manner and right women are selected. Application must be invited by wide circulation so that all potential beneficiaries get an opportunity to apply for the allowance. Besides, all the criteria laid down in the implementation guidelines of the government particularly in selecting the beneficiaries must be followed at all times.

**Committee Structure:** The government must ensure that the committees engaged in selecting the beneficiaries at the Ward level should not be dominated and influenced by political personnel. The members of the committee must be accepted by local people and they must be neutral enough to see the interest of all in the locality. Those people should be in the Committees who would be able to objectively select the beneficiaries.

**Clarification in implementation guideline:** The problems that arise due to lack of clarification of many clauses in the guideline must be taken care of and explanation should be offered along with the guidelines so that no confusion arises in selection of beneficiaries or in at any other areas or at any other stages.

**Waiting list preparation:** Waiting list is very important to select the most deserving women in a locality. So, the concerned authority must prepare the waiting list judiciously.

**Training to the concerned:** Training must be given to the social welfare workers and local members so that they have the complete knowledge about the guideline and also about the whole process of its implementation.

**Maintaining Database:** The concerned authority must prepare database of the beneficiaries of all the Safety Net Programmes and they must ensure proper coordination between the government departments involved in the distribution of the Safety Net Programme. This will reduce the chances of getting multiple benefits by the same person.

**Awareness development:** Awareness campaign about the programme must be arranged in the locality so that the potential beneficiaries are aware of the programmes and can also raise their voice if necessary. This will help reducing the manipulation that are generally common in the process of selection of beneficiaries and also in the overall implementation of the programme.

**Proper monitoring and supervision:** Regular supervision and in depth monitoring from the higher officials keep the implementing officials alert and up-to-date with the present

requirement. There is also less possibility of involving in corrupt practices by the officials in the field level. To ensure appropriate selection of beneficiaries, proper monitoring and supervision from the higher authorities must be ensured.

**8.5 Conclusion:** The Social Safety Net Programmes are very important programmes for a poor country like Bangladesh. In Bangladesh a significant percentage of the population live below poverty line. They are utterly vulnerable and need support of the government for their survival. For many poor people these allowances are the only sources of their livelihood. However, from the findings of our study it appears that the expectations of many poor remain unfulfilled due to some irregularities found in the system sometimes caused by the implementing authorities. Therefore, the suggestions may be taken into consideration to remove the procedural irregularities in the system. This will help the government to achieve the target of the allowance programme and also support those vulnerable people of the country who live in abject poverty and endless misery.



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## Appendix-A Questionnaire for the Beneficiaries

1. Beneficiary's name      Husband's name:      Father's name:      Mother's name:  
Union:      Upazila:

2. Age:

3. In which ground were you selected?

1) Widow      2) Husband deserted

4. If widowed, then for how long you are widowed?

a. 1 year      b. 2 years      c. 2-4 years      d. More than 4 years      e. others

5. If husband deserted for how long you are divorced or husband deserted?

a. 1 year      b. 2 years      c. 2-4 years      d. more than 4 years      e. others

6. With whom you now live with?

a. Parent's family      b. Husband's family      c. With other relatives      d. Along with children      e. Alone      f. Other (specify)

7. Do you have any children?

1. Yes      2. No

A. If yes, how old are they?

8. Do you have any income source?

1. Yes      2.no

A. If no, how do you maintain your family expenses?

a. Getting help from others      b. by borrowing loan      c. begging      c. others.

B. If yes, mention the income source

a. Business      b. Field labor      c. House maid      d. Cultivation.      e. Others

9. What is your monthly income range?

A.500-3000      b.3001-5500      c. 5501-7000      d.7001-9000      e. More than 9000

10. Do you have any family support to maintain your family expenses?

- a. Yes                                b. No

11. If yes, please mention who are they?

A. Mention the monthly income range of the family members.

- a. 500-3000   b.3001-5500   c. 5501-7000   d.7001-9000   e. More than 9000

12. Do you have any land of your own?

1. Yes            2.no

13. If yes, please mention the amount you have.

14. Are you in receipt of any of these benefits?

1. Working in govt. or non-government institution. 2. Getting pension facilities as heredity  
3.VGD card holder as a distressed lady. 4. Getting any other regular government grant. 5.  
Getting regular financial grant from any non-government or social welfare institution.

**Selection procedure**

15. How did you come to know about this programme?

1. Radio/TV   2.Newspaper       3 .From a member of the Union Parishad       4.from local  
circulation.   5. Someone from the village   6.from relatives.   7. Others.

16. Did you make any application for the allowance?

1. Yes       2.No       3.Don't know

A. If yes, have you made it by yourself?

1. Yes            2. No

B. If no, who made it for you?

1. Your relatives   2.local member       3. By neighbors       3. Unknown person       4.others

17. What do you think about the selection?

a. Not at all properly selected (a)    b. Selection is improper in some cases (b)    c. Selection is improper in most cases(c)    d. Always properly selected(d)

A. In case of a, b or c what do you think the reasons behind this?

18. How were you included in the list?

a. Through Chairman b. Union Parishad Member    c. Government officials    d. Open selection  
e. Others

19. Please give your opinion how to make the Widow Allowance Programme more effective?

**Questionnaire for the Officials**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Designation: \_\_\_\_\_ official address: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Do you exactly follow the following process as per the guideline in case of selection of beneficiaries?

Option	Call for application	Circulation	Committee formation
Yes			
No			
In some cases does not follow			

2. If yes, how do you make the circulation?

a. Radio/TV b. Newspaper c. Miking d. Through meeting e. Circulars in the concerned offices and open place. f. Others (specify)

A. In case of no, please mention the reasons.

3. What is the source of verification of the widow, divorce and husband desertedness?

a. Certification by the Union Parishad Chairman. b. By local Union Parishad members c. the Ward Committee examine on the basis of application. d. verification from Social Welfare Office. E. other (specify).

4. How do you verify that the beneficiaries are not getting other types of government /non- Govt. benefits?

5. Do you exactly follow the stages in cases of selection as mentioned in the guideline?

a. Yes b. No c. Sometimes variation

A. In case of b or c please mention the reasons

6. Do you exactly follow the selection criteria as mentioned in the guideline?

a. Yes b. No c. Sometimes does not

A. In case of b or c please mention the reasons. And rank them on a priority basis.





Other		
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13. Did you get any feedback after inspection done by the higher officials?

- a. Yes                      b. No

14. How do they give direction in most cases?

- a. Orally                      b. Written              c. Both

15. Do you maintain the written document?

- a. Yes                      b No

16. Do they crosscheck the direction?

- a. Yes              b. No

17. How do you take steps after their direction?

- a. Always                      b. Sometimes                      c. In most cases

**Co-ordination**

18. Please mention about the following committees?

Upazila	No of meetings performed in the year,2011	
	Upazila committee	Ward committee
Mithapukur		
Dumuria		

19. Are the meetings held within due time as mentioned in the implementation guideline?

- a. Yes                      b. No

A. If no, mention the reasons.

20. How do you contact to the higher officials during finding any difficulties.

- a. Through letters b. Through telephone calls c .By personal presence d. Others (specify)

21. How do you get response during the time of difficulty?

- a. Immediately b. Takes a few days c. Takes a long time. d. Sometimes immediately and e. Some times take long time e. Others.

22. How do you deal with difficult circumstances?

- a. Take immediate help from immediate higher authorities b. Take help from dg office/ministry
- c. Solve the problem locally d. Sometimes solve locally sometimes take help of higher authorities

23. Please give your opinion how to make the Widow Allowance Programme more effective?

## Appendix-B

### Some key information of the Unions under study

<b>Information</b>	<b>Latifpur</b>	<b>Kharnia</b>
Area (in acres)	7587	5160
Population	30876	18473
Male	15917	9615
Female	14959	8858
Literacy rate	47.23	46.41
Male	49.5	51.93
Female	44.83	40.53
<b>Poverty index</b>		
Upper poverty line(poor)	62.20	32.50
Lower poverty line(extreme poor)	45.50	21.00
Household	7417	3913

Appendix-C

Map of Dumuria Upazila



Source: Banglapeedia

Appendix-D

Map of Mithapukur Upazila



Source: Banglapedia